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IMMUNITY OF FEDERAL AND STATE JUDGES FROM
CIVIL SUIT-TIME FOR A QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY?
While other immunity theories have been modifted by legislative and judicial ac-
tion, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity has survived such challenges intact.
When combined with a reluctance among judicial councils to impose sanctions on
malicious judges, this shield of immunity not only leaves the injured victim without
a remedy, but also allows the offending judge to remain on the bench. After exa-
mining and rejecting the policy considerations supporting total immunity, the au-
thor discusses the civil law system of judicial immunity and the qualified immunity
developed for executive officers. He proposes a partial immunity for judges limited
to good-faith acts and suggests means of enforcing limited judicial liability.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE of judicial immunity from civil suit isdeeply entrenched in the Anglo-American legal system. Immunity has
consistently shielded judges from common law tort actions, including mali-
cious prosecution,' false imprisonment,2 and libel and slander,3 as well as
from statutory suits from deprivations of constitutional and civil rights.4 Al-
though a judge's act may ultimately be overturned by an appellate court,5
the victim often incurs substantial damage in the interim. 6 Furthermore,
1. O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F:2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 926 (1966).
For the outcome of this particular litigation, see note 7 infra.
2. Bavenscroft v. Casey, 139 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1944); Stahl v. Currey, 135 Ohio St. 253,
20 N.E.2d 529 (1939).
3. Garfield v. Palmieri, 297 F.2d 526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871 (1962).
4. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Carter v. Duggan, 455 F.2d 1156 (5th
Cir. 1972); Berg v. Cwiklinski, 416 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1969).
5. The use of appellate review to redress acts of judicial misconduct has been criticized.
See, e.g., Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray
Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615, 638-39 (1970).
6. Damage resulting from judicial misconduct can be direct economic loss from lost
employment or consequential damage from appellate costs, including bail, and reputational or
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correction of present judicial maladministration by removal or disciplinary
proceedings 7 usually is directed only toward the correction of future irres-
ponsible action; it does not compensate for the injuries caused by the judge's
act. These deficiencies of the judicial immunity doctrine along with recent
development in the area of governmental immunity necessitate a serious in-
quiry into the continued validity of absolute judicial immunity.
emotional injury. In Berg v. Cwiklinski, 416 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1969), the plaintiff sued for
recovery of $500,000 alleging "loss of personal reputation and property and frustration and mor-
tification." The plaintiff's cause of action arose out of a traffic violation where he was the
defendant and at which the arresting officer failed to appear. He refused to answer incriminat-
ing questions directed to him by the prosecuting attorney. Upon the recommendation of the
prosecuting officer, the judge placed Berg in contempt of court and held him in custody until
that afternoon, when the arresting officer finally arrived at the court. The judge dismissed the
contempt charge, since the officer then could testify as to the questions concerning the viola-
tion. Damages in this situation would be the loss of a day's wages and possible reputational
injury.
A clearer case of reputational injury and, more significantly, emotional and mental distress,
occurred when a California superior court judge made the following remarks in sentencing
(charge unknown) a 13 year old Mexican-American boy:
You are just an animal. You are lower than an animal. Even animals don't do
that....
Mexican people, after 13 years of age, it's perfectly all right to go out and act like
an animal....
You are no particular good to anybody .... You ought to commit suicide ....
Maybe Hitler was right. The animals in our society probably ought to be de-
stroyed because they have no right to live among human beings.
Kates, supra note 5, at 625 n.28 (conversation overheard by author).
7. A classic example of the problems inherent in removal and disciplinary proceedings
occurred in the case of Federal District Court Judge Stephen Chandler of the Western District
of Oklahoma. During his tenure on the federal bench, Judge Chandler had been the subject of
criminal and civil litigation, as well as being twice disqualified from hearing cases before him.
In 1965, he was sued for malicious prosecution, libel, and slander. In O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352
F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 926 (1966), Judge Chandler had come before a
grand jury and explained that he believed the plaintiff's bankruptcy claim, pending in Chand-
ler's court, was fraudulent. The judge consequently informed the grand jury of possible criminal
acts committed by the plaintiff and urged the 'grand jury to conduct an investigation of these
activities. The result of the grand jury investigation was an indictment brought against the
plaintiff, which was later dismissed. The case against Judge Chandler was dismissed on the basis
of judicial immunity.
An indictment, which was later quashed, charged him with conspiracy to defraud the State
of Oklahoma. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 77 n.4 (1970). After refusing to remove
himself, the judge was twice disqualified by the court of appeals, on the ground of bias toward a
party. Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936
(1966); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 915 (1963).
As a result of this situation, the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970), that all cases presently before Judge Chandler be
reassigned to other judges and no new cases be assigned to him. Misc. Order No. 1111, 382
U.S. 1003, 1004 (1966). This order was later modified so that Judge Chandler could hear the
cases pending before him. During the next few months, the Council and Judge Chandler were
able to reach an agreement resolving this dispute, but the judge, in the meantime, had filed a
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Absolute immunity places an impregnable barrier before a person injured
by malicious judicial misconduct.8 A qualified, good-faith immunity would
alleviate injustices to these innocent victims. The objective of this Note,
therefore, is to review the present law of absolute judicial immunity and to
propose a new system of qualified immunity. Qualified judicial immunity in
civil law countries and the adoption of qualified immunity for executive and
administrative officials in this country provide the analytic framework justify-
ing reform. The final part of the Note will analyze the elements of the pro-
posed alternative system. First, the three potential foundations for the de-
velopment of judicial liability will be discussed: (1) a common law cause of
action based on tort liability; (2) an action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 9 and
(3) a direct constitutional cause of action. Then, a workable standard of liabil-
ity will be suggested, followed by an analysis of the question of whether the
state or the judge must pay the damages.
II. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Two important conditions, both judicially imposed, must be met before a
judge is immunized from civil suit. First, judicial immunity may only be
invoked if the judicial officer 1 0 was acting in a discretionary, rather than a
ministerial, role.1 1 The distinction, however, is one of degree only, since
motion in the United States Supreme Court, asking for leave to petition for a writ of man-
damus. In support of this motion, the judge argued that the pertinent statute did not authorize
the order and that the Council's actions were unconstitutional in that they usurped the constitu-
tional impeachment power. Unfortunately, these issues were never resolved, as the Supreme
Court found that the facts did not justify issuance of the writ. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 386
U.S. 74 (1970). However, the Chandler situation has led to renewed discussion of the adequacy
of impeachment as a means of removing federal judges. See generally Battisti, An Independent
Judiciary or an Evanescent Dream? 25 CASE W. Rzs. L. REv. 711 (1975): Stolz, Disciplining
Federal judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless? 57 CA.LIr. L. REv. 659 (1969) Comment, The Lini-
tations of Article III on the Proposed judicial Removal Machinery: S. 1506, 118 U. PA. L. REv.
1064 (1970); Note, The Chandler Incident and Problems of Judicial Removal, 19 STAN. L. REv.
448 (1967); Comment, Removal of Federal Judges--New Alternatives to an Old Problem, 13
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1385 (1966); Note, Removal of Federal Judges-Alternatives to Impeachment,
20 VAND. L. REv. 723 (1967).
8. The procedural effect of absolute immunity is significantly different from that of qual-
ified immunity. Absolute immunity "defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions
were within the scope of the immunity. The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends
upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established by the evidence at trial."
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
320-22 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1974).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
10. Although "judicial officers" has been interpreted to include prosecuting attorneys and
other court officers (see Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J.
322 (1969)), for purposes of this Note, the term "judicial officers" is limited to appointed or
elected judges.
11. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879). To filfill his discretionary role, the judge
must use his personal judgment in performing the act; in his ministerial role, the judge is
1977]
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"it would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly
ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its per-
formance." 12 Second, the judge must have subject matter jurisdiction over
the case. 13 This condition immunizes a judge even if he acts in excess of his
jurisdictional authority. The distinction between acts without jurisdiction and
those in excess of jurisdiction was clarified by Mr. Justice Field in Bradley
v. Fisher,14 when he observed:
Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any
authority exercised is a usurped authoiity, and for the exercise of
such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the
judge, no excuse is permissible. But where the jurisdiction over
the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court
which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction
shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determi-
nation as any other questions involved in the case, although upon
the correctness of his determination in these particulars the valid-
ity of his judgments may depend.' 5
'If the judge is acting within his discretionary power and has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, he may be immune from any civil liability, even
when his acts are based on malicious or corrupt motives. 16
required by law to perform certain acts in specific ways. The same distinction applies to other
governmental officers performing administrative functions. See W. PROSSER, HANmBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 988-90 (4th ed. 1971). The underlying policy favoring immunity
for discretionary acts is that
where the matter is trusted to the discretion or judgment of an officer, the very
nature of the authority is inconsistent with responsibility in damages for the manner
of its exercise, since to hold the officer to such responsibility would be to confer a
discretion and then make its qxercise a wrong.
2 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 312, at 420-21 (4th ed. 1932).
12. Ham v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468 (1920).
13. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1872). Whether the judge has subject
matter jurisdiction depends on the nature of the grant of jurisdiction to his court. If the judge
has the "authority of law to act officially in the matter then at hand," he has jurisdiction over
the case. 2 T. COOLEY, supra note 11, at 437.
Jurisdiction may exist in situations other than in a courtroom; for example, a judge has
jurisdiction over certain matters within his office. McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.
1972). A judge, though, does not have jurisdiction to use physical force to eject a person from
his courtroom and can be held liable for assault and battery. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59
(9th Cir. 1974).
14. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
15. Id. at 351-52.
16. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (statutory cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970) for deprivation of civil rights); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)
(common law action for trespass); Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586, 588 (5th Cir. 1974);
Skolnick v. Campbell, 398 F.2d 23, 26-27 (7th Cir. 1968); O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987,
988 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 926 (1966); Meredith v. Van Oosterhout, 286 F.2d
216, 220 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 835 (1961); John v. Gibson, 270 F.2d 36, 39
(9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 970 (1960).
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Two theories have been used in attempting to hold judges liable for their
acts. The first is a tort action brought in state courts;17 the second is based
on 42 U.S.C. § 1983,18 which provides a cause of action for deprivations of
constitutional and civil rights.' 9 Absolute judicial immunity, however, has
consistently precluded suits under both of these theories.
Absolute immunity from tort actions did not fully develop until the
1870's. Prior to that time, some state courts had immunized those judges
who acted in good faith, whereas other courts had upheld absolute judicial
immunity.2 0 For example, a survey of 19th century case law in 14 randomly
selected eastern and midwestern states shows that in nine states the prevail-
ing rule was absolute immunity,2 ' in four states immunity depended upon
the judge's good faith, 22 and in one state the law was inconclusive.2
Many administrative officers also enjoy immunity from suit because of the discretionary
function inherent in the nature of their jobs. Early cases established an absolute immunity for
administrative officers. E.g., Stewart v. Case, 53 Minn. 62, 54 N.W. 938 (1893). The modem
trend, however, is to permit only a qualified immunity dependent upon the good faith of the
officer in performing the act. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Nelson v. Knox, 256
F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958). See generally Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MicH.
L. REv. 201 (1956); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263
(1937). Although the same rationale (the discretionary function exception) is used to support
both executive and judicial immunity, executive immunity is becoming increasingly qualified.
The degree of qualification is dependent not only on the good faith of the official, but also on
the scope of his discretion and the existence of reasonable grounds, in light of the cir-
cumstances, to support the belief formed. See text accompanying notes 148-64 infra.
17. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
19. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
20. The ambiguity found in these decisions is exemplified in Phelps v. Sills, 1 Day 315
(Conn. 1804), one of the earliest cases to apply judicial immunity. In Phelps, the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut, after reviewing prior English cases, stated: "It is, therefore, a
settled principle, that however erroneous his judgment may be, either by positive acts, neglect,
or refusal to do certain acts, or however injurious to a suitor, a judge is never liable, in any civil
action, for damages arising from his mistake." Id. at 329. On its face, this statement would seem
to support absolute immunity, regardless of the motives of the judge. There is some question,
however, whether this is an accurate interpretation. The court noted specifically that "no impur-
ity of motive is imputed to [the defendant judge] and none is to be inferred." Id. This comment
by the court indicates that proof of bad faith or malicious intent might have led to a different
result.
21. Hamilton v. Williams, 26 Ala. 527 (1855); Trammel v. Town of Russellville, 34 Ark. 105
(1879); Deal v. Harris, 8 Md. 40 (1855); Stewart v. Case, 53 Minn. 62, 54 N.W. 938 (1893);
Stone v. Graves, 8 Mo. 111 (1843); Scott v. Fishblate, 117 N.C. 265, 23 S.E. 436 (1895); Root
v. Rose, 6 N.D. 575, 72 N.W. 1022 (1897); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810); Rudd v.
Darling, 64 Vt. 456, 25 A. 479 (1892).
22. Garfield v. Douglass, 22 I11. 100 (1859); Wasson v. Mitchell, 18 Iowa 153 (1864); Greg-
ory v. Brown, 7 Ky. 28 (1815); Vennum v. Huston, 38 Neb. 293, 56 N.W. 970 (1893).
23. Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day 315 (Conn. 1804). A commentator who conducted a more extensive
study of state judicial immunity prior to 1871 found that absolute judicial immunity had been
adopted in thirteen states, and in six states immunity was dependent upon good faith. The
other eighteen states either had not ruled on this question or their decisions were unclear.
Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 326-27 (1969).
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The United States Supreme Court addressed judicial immunity for the
first time in 1868. In Randall v. Brigham,2 4 the plaintiff-attorney had been
found guilty of malpractice and misconduct by the Massachusetts Superior
Court.25  The court, acting pursuant to state statute, disbarred the plaintiff,
who then brought a civil suit for wrongful removal against the superior court
judge.2 6  Mr. Justice Field incorporated two English concepts into the judi-
cial immunity doctrine announced by the Court.27  Apparently aware of the
English distinctions between inferior and superior judges 2 and good faith
as opposed to malicious acts,29 Justice Field observed:
Many of the states upholding judicial immunity from civil liability allowed judges to be
brought to trial for criminal acts. See, e.g., Evans v. Foster, 1 N.H. 375 (1819); Lining v.
Bentham, 1 S.C.L. (2 Bay) I (S.C. 1796).
24. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
25. Id. at 526.
26. Id.
27. Great Britain originally allowed civil suits against judges. These suits were in the form
of a complaint of "false judgment," and were brought against the judge causing the injury. See 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 664-68 (2d ed. 1898). Only
justices of the King's court were allowed to hear the suit and they could find for the complain-
ant either on the basis of a factual error in the record or as a matter of law. Id. at 666-67. If the
King's justices decided favorably for the complainant, the inferior court's judgment would be
annulled and pecuniary damages would be paid in certain cases. Id. at 667. Although Great
Britain later adopted judicial immunity, these suits may have been the basis for the exception to
the doctrine in the case of an inferior court judge acting in bad faith. See notes 28-29 infra.
28. In Great Britain, a distinction developed between acts done within the court's jurisdic-
tion and those acts done in excess of the court's jurisdiction. An inferior court judge acting in
excess of his jurisdiction would not be immune, whereas often a superior court judge, also
acting in excess of his jurisdiction, would be immune. See Prickett v. Gratiex, 115 Eng. Rep.
1158 (K.B. 1846); Davis v. Capper, 109 Eng. Rep. 362 (K.B. 1829); 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 239 (1924). The theory supporting liability of inferior court justices
was that since the jurisdiction of an inferior court was set by law, those justices could not
determine their jurisdiction. If they attempted to do so and erred in defining its limits too
broadly, this was the equivalent of acting outside their jurisdiction. Id. Because a superior court
judge, on the other hand, did have the authority to determine his jurisdiction, it was difficult to
allege that he had exceeded his jurisdictional limits. See J. CLERK & W. LINDSELL, TORTS
1976 (13th ed. 1969).
The liability of inferior court justices for acts in excess of their jurisdiction was codified in
the Justices' Protection Act of 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 44, § 1. Section 1 of the Act provided that
a judge, acting within his jurisdiction, could be sued for malicious conduct. The malice re-
quirement of section 1, however, did not have to be fulfilled where the justice acted in excess
of his jurisdiction. Id. § 2.
29. During the 19th century, an English inferior court judge was liable for malicious or
corrupt acts, even when the judge acted within his authority. Linford v. Fitzroy, 116 Eng. Rep.
1253, 1258 (Q.B. 1849); Cave v. Mountain, 133 Eng. Rep. 330, 333 (C.P. 1840); Burley v.
Bethune, 128 Eng. Rep. 816, 818 (C.P. 1814). Thus, the judge was immune only where he
acted within his jurisdiction and in good faith. This concept was codified in section 1 of the
Justices' Protection Act of 1848, which stated:
[E]very action hereafter to be brought against any justice of the peace for any act
done by him in the execution of his duty as such justice, with respect to any matter
within his jurisdiction as such justice, shall be an action on the case as for a tort;
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[I]t is a general principle applicable to all judicial officers, that they
are not liable to a civil action for any judicial act done within their
jurisdiction. In reference to judges of limited and inferior author-
ity, it has been held that they are protected only when they act
within their jurisdiction. If this be the case with respect to them,
no such limitation exists with respect to judges of superior or gen-
eral authority. They are not liable to civil actions for their judicial
acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, unless
perhaps where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done mali-
ciously or corruptly.3 0
Thus, the first Supreme Court decision on judicial immunity allowed excep-
tions to the doctrine for malicious or corrupt judicial acts and for acts of
inferior court judges in excess of their jurisdiction.
Three years later, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to reconsider
the doctrine of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher.31 During the trial of
John Suratt for the murder of President Lincoln, Bradley, an attorney for
the defendant, accosted and threatened Judge Fisher, the presiding judge.3 2
The judge subsequently ordered attorney Bradley's name to be stricken from
the roll of the District of Columbia Criminal Court.33 Bradley thereupon
brought a civil suit against Judge Fisher, requesting pecuniary damages of
$20,000.34
The Court, with apparent indifference to the qualified immunity doctrine
announced in Randall, held that "judges of courts are not liable to civil
actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their
jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." 3 5
To reconcile his earlier statements in Randall with the holding of absolute
judicial immunity in Bradley, Justice Field wrote:
and in the declaration it shall be expressly alleged that such act was done mali-
ciously, and without reasonable and probable cause.
Justices' Protection Act of 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 44, § 1.
Mr. Justice Field, however, expanded the concept of malicious judicial acts by applying it to
all judges, not solely to inferior court judges, which had been the limit imposed by the English
courts.
30. 74 U.S. at 535-36 (emphasis added).
31. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
32. Id. at 337. Although the order stated that the threat occurred as the judge was leaving
the bench during a recess, the plaintiff claimed in his declaration that he did not approach the
judge until the judge had left the courthouse. Id. at 337-38.
33. Id. The plaintiff, however, interpreted the order as striking his name from the rolls of
the Criminal Court and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Although the criminal
court later became a branch of the supreme court, the Supreme Court found that at the time of
the act, the two courts were separate and independent. Id. at 344-45.
34. Id. at 338-39.
35. Id. at 351 (emphasis added). The reason offered by Mr. Justice Field for dispelling the
notion that liability is dependent upon the motive of the judge is that a losing party would claim
a malicious motive solely to get his claim into court and in disregard of whether the motive
ascribed had any basis in fact. Id. at 354.
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The qualifying words [in the Randall opinion] were inserted upon
the suggestion that the previous language laid down the doctrine of
judicial exemption from liability to civil actions in terms broader
than was necessary for the case under consideration, and that if the
language remained unqualified it would require an explanation of
some apparently conflicting adjudications found in the reports.
They were not intended as an expression of opinion that ,in the
cases supposed such liability would exist, but to avoid the expres-
sion of a contrary doctrine.
36
After Bradley, then, a person injured by malicious judicial conduct was
precluded from bringing a tort action against the judge. Since the common
law tort action was the only vehicle upon which a judicial misconduct suit
could be based at that time, the Bradley decision had the effect of prohibit-
ing all civil suits against judges.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Randall, but while Brad-
ley was being argued before the Court, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.37 The main purposes of the Act were to protect black citizens
from organized racist movements,38 and to provide a remedy for injuries
that were occurring at the hands of federal and state law enforcement offi-
cials during Reconstruction. Section 1 of the 1871 Act 3 9 provided:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 40
36. Id. at 351.
37. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat.. 13 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)). This Act was
passed in response to criticism of the ineffective enforcement of state laws in the South during
Reconstruction. Although the Act was aimed at state officials in general, the judicial malad-
ministration occurring at this time was a specific target of the Act's supporters. For example,
Senator Osborn observed that "justice is mocked, innocence punished, perjury rewarded, and
crime defiant in the halls of justice." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1871). Represen-
tative Platt equated the Southern county judges with "little Kings, with almost despotic pow-
ers." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 186 app. (1871).
38. The debates over the Act centered on the activities of the Ku Klux Klan to the extent
that the 1871 Act became known as the "Ku Klux Klan Act." See the debates on the Civil
Rights Act in CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871).
39. Section 1 is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Although at the time of passage section 1983 was a rather
uncontroversial part of the entire Act, in the last 15 years the number of section 1983 actions
has skyrocketed. See Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORDi. 557, 563;
Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsi-
dered, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 615, 620 n.19 (1970).
[Vol. 27:727
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
For the first time, it appeared there was statutory authority for relief
from judicial abuse.41 Yet, by the turn of the century the possibility of suits
against judicial officers under section 1 had received little attention. Even
though congressional debates on the Civil Rights Act indicated that state
judges were defendants within the anticipated scope of that section, 42 it was
not until 1945 that a federal court discussed this issue in depth. In Picking
v. Pennsylvania Railroad,4 3 the Third Circuit held that judicial immunity
was not a valid defense to a suit brought under section 1983, the successor
to section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The plaintiffs in Picking had
been denied a hearing after their arrest in violation of their fourteenth
amendment due process rights.a4 Suing under section 1983, the plaintiffs
named 23 defendants, including the judge. On the issue of judicial immun-
ity, the court reasoned:
[Tihe privilege as we have stated was a rule of the common law.
Congress possessed the power to wipe it out. We think that the
conclusion is irresistible that Congress by enacting the Civil Rights
Act sub judice intended to abrogate the privilege to the extent
indicated by that act and in fact did so .... The statute must be
deemed to include members of the state judiciary acting in official
capacity. 45
Although other federal circuit courts also found judicial liability under sec-
tion 1983 within a few years of Picking,4 6 the Picking holding, and those
41. Although the plain import of the statutory language would seem to indicate that its
application to individuals acting under color of state law is unlimited, recent Supreme Court
decisions have held that the statute is not applicable to state legislators, judges, and pros-
ecutors. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). As support for this interpretation the Court has cited the
1871 debates on the Act. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); Tenney v. Brand-
hove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). The debates, including the expressed intent of the author of
section 1 of the Act, do not support the Court's interpretation of the term "person," particularly
when used in reference to judicial officers. See notes 66-77 infra and accompanying text.
42. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 365-66 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); id. at 217 app.
(remarks of Sen. Thurman). See notes 68-77 infra and accompanying text.
43. 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947). This case was sub-
sequently overruled in Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (1966).
44. 151 F.2d at 245.
45. Id. at 250.
46. In McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949), the plaintiff claimed that a
justice of the peace, a constable, and others had conspired to deprive her of a fair and impartial
jury in violation of her fourteenth amendment due process rights. She brought suit against
these state officials under the early counterparts of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970). The
McShane court did not specifically discuss the judicial immunity issue, apparently because it
had not been raised by the defendant. The court, however, did find that all the defendants,
including the judge, were state officers acting under color of state law and therefore the district
court had jurisdiction over them under section 1983.
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decisions adopting it, were rendered nugatory by later judicial rulings. 47
In 1951 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of state legislators' im-
munity from section 1983 suits. The Court in Tenney v. Brandhove48 held
that the common law rule of immunity for legislators survived the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 and rendered state legislators immune from a section
1983 suit.49  The Tenney decision provided a sample statutory construction
for courts determining judicial immunity under section 1983.
The Supreme Court, however, hesitated to apply the Tenney rationale to
state judicial officers, and it consistently denied certiorari in federal court
cases establishing judicial immunity in section 1983 suits5 until Pierson v.
Ray was decided in 1967. 51 In Pierson, a group of black clergymen attempt-
ing to use a "white only" waiting room in a Jackson, Mississippi, bus termi-
nal were arrested and convicted of violating a state breach-of-the-peace stat-
ute. 52  Only one year before Pierson, the Court in Boynton v. Virginia53
had determined that racial discrimination against interstate passengers in bus
terminals was violative of the Interstate Commerce Act.M Although the de-
fense directed the police court judge to the Boynton holding, 55 he imposed the
maximum sentence upon the defendants. 56 The judge's decision was reversed
One year after the Picking decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also interpreted a
predecessor to section 1983 as including state judges. Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791
(2d Cir. 1946).
47. See cases cited in Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1955).
48. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
49. The immunity of legislators was more strongly entrenched in Anglo-American law prior
to 1871 than was judicial immunity. The constitutions of the federal and many state govern-
ments contained provisions upholding this immunity. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6; MASS.
CONST. of 1780, art. 21; N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. 30. This historical analysis provided the
foundation for the Tenney opinion. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-76 (1951).
50. E.g., O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 926,
reh. denied, 385 U.S. 889 (1966); Garfield v. Palmieri, 297 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 871 (1962); Meredith v. Van Oosterhout, 286 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 835 (1961); John v. Gibson, 270 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 970 (1960); Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956);
Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955); Francis v.
Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 835 (1953).
51. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
52. MIss. CODE ANN. § 2087.5 (Supp. 1971), provided that it is a misdemeanor for a group
of people, who have congregated in a public place in such a manner that a breach of the peace
may occur, to refuse to leave when ordered to move on by the police. After the arrest had
occurred in Pierson, but before the Supreme Court's decision, this statute was held unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court in Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965).
53. 364 U.S. 454 (1960). The petitioner in Boynton had been arrested and convicted for
attempting to use part of an interstate bus terminal restaurant designated for "white only."
54. Id. at 463-64.
55. Kates, supra note 40, at 628-29.
56. Maximum sentences in this instance consisted of a $200 fine and four months in jail. 386
U.S. at 549-50. Here, damages potentially would include all of the elements described in note
6 supra.
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by a state appellate court, 57 but the clergymen brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the police
court judge and the officers making the arrest for false arrest and violation of
section 19 83 .58
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, recognized only
limited immunity for the police officers, depending on whether they had
acted in good faith and with probable cause. 59 Nevertheless, the Court
found the police court judge absolutely immune from section 1983 suits. The
decision was based on (1) the belief that judicial immunity was a well-
established principle of common law 60 and (2) the legislative history of sec-
tion 1 of the Civil Rights Act. 61 However, both the pre-1871 judicial im-
munity cases and the legislative history of the Act indicate that Mr. Chief
Justice Warren's reasons were unsound. 62
Judicial immunity was not unanimously supported under the common
law nor was it "solidly established" by 1871. The doctrine had strong roots
in the English judicial system, but not even in England was total immunity
granted to inferior court judges.63 There were also differences among the
states in the application of the doctrine even after it was adopted in the
United States and only half the states had any type of judicial immunity in
1871 . 4 It is therefore difficult to support Chief Justice Warren's statement
57. 386 U.S. at 550.
58. In the federal district court, a jury found in favor of both the judge and the police
officers. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, found the judge immune. Since
the state statute under which the police officers acted was later held unconstitutional (see note
52 supra), the court found that they could be held liable under section 1983 even if good faith
and probable cause in making the arrest were shown.
59. 386 U.S. at 557.
60. Mr. Chief Justice Warren concluded, without elaboration, that "few doctrines were
more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages
for acts committed within their judicial discretion." 386 U.S. at 553-54.
61. After summarily noting some of the reasons for the doctrine, the Court turned to the
legislative history of section 1983. Chief Justice Warren concluded that since the legislative
record did not indicate that Congress intended to "abolish wholesale all common-law im-
munities," and that "Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the
doctrine," judicial officers had an absolute immunity from section 1983 actions. Id. at 554-55.
The Court also relied on Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), and Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), to support its position.
62. Mr. Justice Douglas vigorously dissented from the Court's interpretation of the common
law and the legislative history. By reviewing the attitudes of certain representative members of
the 42d Congress, Justice Douglas was able to present a strong criticism of the majority's view
of congressional intent: "The position that Congress did not intend to change the common-law
rule of judicial immunity ignores the fact that every member of Congress who spoke on the
issue assumed that the words of the statute meant what they said and that judges would be
liable." 386 U.S. at 561.
63. See notes 28-29 supra.
64. An observer has noted that of the 37 states existing by 1871, only 13 had adopted
absolute immunity, 6 provided only a qualified immunity, 9 states had not clearly resolved the
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that "few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the
immunity of judges." 65
The Court's unjustified reliance upon the legislative history of section 1
has been severely criticized.6 6  Although the Court correctly stated that
there is "no clear indication ... Congress meant to abolish wholesale all
common-law immunities [by enacting the Civil Rights Act],'"6 7 this does not
mean that Congress intended to preserve all of the common law immunities,
including those which existed for the judiciary. In fact, the legislative record
indicated that Congress recognized and accepted the fact that state judges
would not be immune from actions based on section 1 of the Act. Most of
the members of Congress believed that the maladministration of justice in
the South was due to some extent to acts or omissions of state judicial offi-
cers. 68 The legislative record is replete with statements similar to the one
quoted by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion: "Mr. Rainey of
South Carolina noted that 'The courts are in many instances under the con-
trol of those who are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law
and equity.' "69
Furthermore, opponents of the bill did not hesitate to condemn the
scope of section 1 for including judges as potential defendants. Representa-
tive Lewis of Kentucky observed that "by the first section, in certain cases,
the judge of a State court, though acting under oath of office, is made liable
to a suit in the Federal court and subject to damages for his decision against
a suitor, however honest and conscientious that decision may be." 70 Another
Congressman had a more dramatic response to the intended scope of section
1:
Under the provisions of this section every judge in the State court
... will enter upon and pursue the call of official duty with the
sword of Damocles suspended over him by a silken thread, and
bent upon him the scowl of unbridled power, the forerunner of the
impending wrath, which is gathering itself to burst upon its vic-
tim .... 71
issue either for or against the doctrine, and the final 9 states bad not been presented with the
issue. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 326-27 (1969).
65. 386 U.S. at 553-54.
66. E.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559-63 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Kates, Im-
munity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65
Nw. U.L. Rxv. 615, 621-23 (1970); Note, Liability ofJudicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79
YALE L.J. 322, 327-28 (1969).
67. 386 U.S. at 554.
68. See note 37 supra.
69. 386 U.S. at 559.
70. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 385 (1871).
71. Id. at 366 (remarks of Rep. Arthur). See id. at 217 app. (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
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Apparently, both sides believed that section 1 included judges; the propo-
nents of the bill never denied the opposition's statements concerning the
inclusion of judges.
Additional legislative support exists for holding judges not immune from
section 1983 suits. Section 1 was designed to complement an 1866 statute
that provided a criminal remedy for the same deprivations for which section
1 provided a civil remedy. 72  The debate over the 1866 criminal statute
confirms that that statute, as well as section 1, was to include judges. For
example, Representative Eldridge objected to the bill because it attached
"pains and penalties to the judge of a State court who, in the exercise of his
judicial functions, shall act contrary to its provisions. '- 73  Members of the
Senate were similarly distressed by the provision. 74  Representative Wilson,
the author of the 1866 Act, observed that if Congress had the authority to
make judges criminally liable, then it could also make them civilly liable. 75
In fact, the use of the 1866 Act as a model for section 1 of the 1871 Act was
specifically advocated by the author of the 1871 Act.76 The relationship
between the two sections was also recognized by the Supreme Court in
Monroe v. Pape.77
Because the doctrine of judicial immunity was judicially created, it is
reasonable to assume that the legislators of the 42d Congress looked to con-
temporary judicial decisions to determine the extent of the immunity. Such
an examination reveals the judicial viewpoint in 1871, as expressed in Ran-
dall, of partial immunity dependent on the good faith of the judge and his
jurisdictional authority; 78 the absolute immunity theory of Bradley had not
72. Representative Shellabarger, the author of the 1871 Act, stated:
My first inquiry is as to the warrant which we have for enacting such a section as
this. The model for it will be found in the second section of the act of April 9, 1866,
known as the "civil rights act". That section provides a criminal proceeding in iden-
tically the same case as this one provides a civil remedy for ....
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 app. (1871); Compare Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, §
1, 17 Stat. 13 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)) with Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §
2, 14 Stat. 27 (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)).
The criminal statute, section 242, provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, will-
fully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on ac-
count of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are
prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to
imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
73. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1154-55 (1866).
74. Id. at 475-76 (Sens. Cowan and Trunbull).
75. Id. at 1925.
76. See note 72 supra.
77. 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961).
78. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
1977]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
yet been developed. 79 The Supreme Court's position on the question of
immunity is reflected in the aforementioned congressional belief that judges
could be liable under the 1871 Act.
Thus, a careful review of the legislative history of section 1983 and of
contemporary case law indicates that the legislature intended to impose lia-
bility on those judges who violated section 1983. The Pierson v. Ray deci-
sion is typical of many decisions, both federal and state, which have unjusti-
fiably upheld judicial immunity without adequately analyzing the doctrine.
Nevertheless, the Pierson holding is the governing rule.s0 Although the
courts have recently qualified the immunity doctrine with respect to execu-
tive, administrative, and other quasi-judicial officers who perform discretion-
ary acts, 8 1 they have consistently upheld judicial immunity as prohibiting
section 1983 suits against judges.
79. The Bradley case was decided six months after the debates on the 1871 Act had ended.
80. In the closely related field of prosecutorial immunity, however, the Supreme Court
recently has held that a prosecutor, acting within the scope of his duties in prosecuting criminal
cases, has absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages brought under section 1983. Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Imbler presented a situation where the petitioner was found
guilty of a first degree felony-murder and was sentenced to death. After the trial, new cor-
roborative witnesses supporting Imbler's alibi were discovered and the credibility of the pros-
ecution's prime identification witness came into question. Consequently, Imbler petitioned the
California Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, but the state court denied the writ. In re
Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 387 P.2d 6, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 908 (1964).
Five years later, Imbler petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus on the
same grounds. The federal court, arriving at a different result from that reached by the state
court, found that the prosecution knew that some of their prime witness' testimony was mislead-
ing and had cause to suspect that other testimony was false. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp.
795 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The writ was granted and Imbler was released. Imbler then filed a 1983
action against the prosecutor for unlawful deprivation of his liberty.
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Powell, the Supreme Court reviewed the common law ap-
proach to prosecutorial immunity and the policy reasons supporting immunity in arriving at its
conclusion of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The Court also attempted to delineate the dis-
tinction between recipients of only a qualified immunity and those officers entitled to absolute
immunity. This ambiguous distinction, along with its ramifications on judicial immunity, is criti-
cally analyzed at notes 165-85 infra and accompanying text.
The Imbler decision recently has been applied to a suit alleging a direct constitutional cause
of action against an assistant United States district attorney. Although this was not a section
1983 action, the Third Circuit found that the Imbler policy considerations existed under this
new cause of action and therefore granted an absolute immunity to the federal prosecutor. See
Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976).
81. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (Superintendent of state mental institution
has a qualified immunity); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (School official has only a
qualified, good-faith immunity, dependent upon whether "he knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student." Id. at 322.) (This
same test was applied in O'Connor.); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (Executive offi-
cials have a qualified immunity, dependent upon'the existence of reasonable grounds for the
belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief."
Id. at 247-48.).
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III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS
SUPPORTING ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
The Court's decisions in Bradley and Pierson firmly entrench the
judiciary's immunity from either tort or section 1983 suits. Even so, the four
policy reasons typically recited to support judicial immunity demonstrate the
doctrine's inherent fallacies. s2
The need for finality in judicial proceedings is the first justification for
immunity.8 Arguably, the immunity doctrine provides a final resolution in
a system of potentially infinite controversies.8 In theory, a plaintiff who
lost a suit could bring another suit against that judge, and another suit
against the judge who heard the case against the trial judge, ad infinitum.8 5
The initial premise of this argument, however, is faulty. As a practical mat-
ter, numerous suits would deplete the financial resources of the litigant,
particularly if he lost in the lower court and had to pay his own expenses as
well as court costs. Furthermore, there are means other than judicial im-
munity to achieve finality. Within the last century the American legal sys-
tem has undergone intense introspection resulting in the advent of more
extensive procedural safeguards. Little judicial time would be wasted by
using a summary judgment 8 6 or other pretrial procedure to dispose of a
frivolous suit against a judge.8 7
The need for an independent judiciary is another rebuttable argument
supporting judicial immunity. 8 For our purposes, the term "independent
82. Many of the reasons offered in support of executive or administrative immunity are
either identical or analogous to the reasoning advanced in defense of judicial immunity. See
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). But see
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Yet, recent cases have held that executive and ad-
ministrative officers are entitled to only a qualified, good-faith immunity. See text accompanying
notes 148-56 infra.
83. See Floyd and Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1306 (K.B. 1608), where Lord Coke ex-
pressed the common fear that allowing such suits would lead to infinite controversies.
84. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263, 271-74
(1937).
85. 2 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 312, at 425 (4th ed. 1932).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
87. The most common means of disposing of a case in this situation, other than by summary
judgment, would be a judgment on the pleadings. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(c). In addition, the
presiding judge may hold a pretrial conference with the parties at which time he may discour-
age the continuance of a frivolous suit. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
88. One of the most often quoted statements of this argument is in Scott v. Stansfield, L.R.
3 Ex. 220 (1868), where the court reasoned that the doctrine is not for the protection of the
judge, "but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty
to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences." Id. at 223.
Although the Scott court negated the practical result that it is the judge who is receiving the
protection, it was correct in observing that the public will benefit to some extent by the immun-
ity doctrine. The benefit to the public from an independent judiciary must be balanced against
the need to provide a remedy to the injured party. Under a system of total immunity, there is
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judiciary" 8 9 means that the judge should be protected from influence
exerted by private parties. 90 However, the judiciary is not independent of
public whim. On both the state and local levels judges are often elected, not
appointed, and so must answer to the public. Even where judges are ap-
pointed, they are often subject to pressure from political parties directly
reflecting the prevailin. attitudes of their constituencies. When the inde-
pendence theory has been applied to the executive branch as a basis for
sovereign immunity, cases abrogating state tort immunity 9 ' have indicated
that the independence of government institutions cannot override the need
to remedy government-caused injuries. The same reasoning should be ap-
plied to the judiciary.
It is also argued that putting a judge on the stand as a defendant will
diminish respect for his subsequent actions. 92 Although trying a judge may
lessen respect for the individual, respect for the judiciary as an institution is
more seriously undermined by not requiring the judge to account for his
malicious acts. 93
If judges were unable to claim immunity it is arguable that they would
be sued by every party who was dissatisfied with the outcome of his case, 94
no balancing in a particular case, since this system rests on the assumption that the public need
automatically outweighs the private remedy. But if the judicial act is maliciously motivated,
then it might be advisable to limit that judge's independence and to make him fear the con-
sequences of his malicious act, since in this situation the public is not being benefitted but is
being injured by propagating a judicial system in which judges have the freedom to act mali-
ciously without fear of suit. Hence, the best system is one of a qualified judicial immunity,
which would result in a true "balancing" and greater protection for both the general public and
the private individual.
89. Jennings, supra note 84, at 271. Another interpretation of this phrase is that of inde-
pendence between federal and state governments. The argument is based on a division of
power between federal and state levels, which would be infringed upon if the courts allowed a
state judge to be sued in the federal courts, as occurs in a section 1983 suit. The Supreme
Court, however, has rejected this argument, particularly where the state officer has violated the
claimant's constitutional rights. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). It should also be noted
that one of the purposes of section 1983 was to allow suits against state officers in federal courts
and the federal-state conflict was ineffectively used as an argument against the passage of the
1871 Act.
90. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282,
298 (N.Y. 1810); Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868).
91. See, e.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Smith
v. Idaho, 93 Idaho 795, 437 P.2d 937 (1970); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 I!1.
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1959);,Willis v. Department of Conservation
& Economic Div., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153
(1975); Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). See generally Van Alstyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919.
92. 2 T. CooLEY, supra note 85, at 424.
93. The Watergate trials have taught us that respect for any government institution may be
promoted by bringing to justice those officials who abuse their powers.
94. 2 T. CooLEy, supra note 85, at 424.
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and that occupying "the judge's time and mind with the defense of his own
interests," 95 would distract his attention from judicial responsibilities. How-
ever, this threat is illusory. Frivolous or insubstantial claims are easily dis-
missed by summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings. 96 Dismissal
may be granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact,97 providing
a vehicle for the quick elimination of unjustified claims. Most, if not all, of
the frivolous suits brought by parties dissatisfied with the judgment would
be disposed of prior to trial.
In addition, judicial liability may not even increase the number of suits
filed. A person who would bring a frivolous suit under a qualified judicial
immunity system is just as apt to do so under the present system by plead-
ing that the judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction and therefore was
liable for his acts.9 8 More importantly, those claimants who suffer an actual
injury as a result of malicious judicial misconduct should not be denied a
remedy solely to prevent possible frivolous and insubstantial claims. 99
Neither the need for finality, the need for an independent judiciary, the
aversion to a multiplicity of suits, nor the fear of the negative effect on
respect for judicial opinion holds up under close scrutiny as support for judi-
cial immunity. The weakness of these justifications is further demonstrated
by the presence, indeed acceptance, of judicial' liability in other parts of the
world, most notably the civil law countries.
IV JuDIcIAL LIABILITY IN CIVIL LAW
CoUNRIms
Judicial liability has long existed in the civil law countries. Although' the
inherent differences between the common law and the civil law systems
cannot be denied, those relevant to the question of judicial immunity are
insignificant and do not preclude a comparison of immunity under the two
systems.
The fundamental difference between civil and common law jurisdictions
is that common law countries, such as the United States and Great Britain,
depend upon judicial precedents and strict procedural forms of action. The
95. Id.
96. FED. R. Crv. P. 56, 12(c). See note 87 supra.
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
98. See Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 331 &
n.51 (1969).
99. In the area of executive and administrative immunity, the need to provide a remedy to
the injured victim has received greater attention than the protection of the officials from frivol-
ous claims. Although the same problem of frivolous litigation arises in this area, the Supreme
Court has granted executive and administrative officials only a limited, good-faith immunity.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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continental countries, on the other hand, have enacted comprehensive civil
and criminal codes, 100 preferring legislation to case law precedent. Advo-
cates of judicial immunity may seek to explain the success of judicial liability
in civil law countries by contending that the discretion of judges in a civil
law system could not be impeded by judicial liability because civil law
judges merely apply the codifications; they do not exercise discretion. The
inherent weakness in this argument is the premise that a civil law judge
exercises less discretion than his common law counterpart merely because
he relies on codified law. The contrary is true; most of the codes use broad
general terms, allowing a judge great latitude in interpreting a particular
section. 101
Even this major difference between the systems, the preference for
codes over case law, is disappearing. Previous judicial decisions are used
extensively as precedent by the judiciary in civil law countries, while an
increasing amount of legislation is being enacted in common law jurisdic-
tions. It has been noted that
French law is codified, and legislation occupies a paramount posi-
tion. While this statement is valid, it is no more true than an as-
sertion that English, American, or Australian law is based upon
judicial decisions. In many areas of those legal systems legislation
is of great importance, and similarly in France there are areas of
the law that consist primarily of judicial decisions. A few of the
most important areas where this is true are administrative law, pri-
vate international law, and noncontractual liability.10 2
Another distinction pointed to as prohibiting an analogy is that civil law
countries operate under a bifurcated legal system. Under the civil law sys-
tem, private law governs the relationships between private citizens, and
public law presides over governmental organizations and their contact with
individuals.10 3  Although this division is absent in the common law coun-
100. However, judicial decisions are being given more precedential value by the judiciary in
civil law countries. Moreover, an increasing amount of legislation is being enacted in common
law jurisdictions. See text accompanying note 102 infra.
101. Where are a great many cases where the judge's role is far more creative. The legisla-
ture sometimes deliberately speaks in very general terms: it has said that divorce can be
obtained where there are serious grounds; contracts must be performed in good faith; a
person must repair the damage caused another by his fault; the penalty for a crime can
be reduced if there are extenuating circumstances; an act of a government official is
invalid if in excess of his powers. The legislature, however, has not defined serious
grounds or fault, nor explained what is required by good faith nor what constitute ex-
tenuating circumstances.
R. DAVID, Preface to FRENCH LAw: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY xiii
(1972).
102. Id. at xii.
103. See E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAw 6-7 (1968); R. DAVID, TsE FRENCH LEGAL
SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAw SYsTEMs 45-46 (1958); R. DAVID, supra note 101,
at 98-107.
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tries, 10 4 it does not affect the issue of judicial immunity. Under either sys-
tem, the question of judicial immunity is one of private law. 10 5
A third difference is the structure of the judiciary in the respective
systems. Although judicial organization varies among civil law countries,
all have an element in common with the common law countries: the judi-
ciary is independent in theory and practice from the other governmental
branches.106  In civil law countries the court structure is not only divided
vertically as in common law countries, it is divided horizontally into subject
matter areas as well. Thus, in France there are courts which only resolve
As with most code countries, the German legal system relies upon a fundamental distinction
between two areas of law: (1) private law, which includes torts, contracts, property, commercial
transactions, and domestic relations; and (2) public law, which consists of administrative law,
criminal law, and constitutional law. See E. COHN, supra, at 13. The oldest, and probably the
simplest, definition of this distinction was offered by Ulpian in his Digest: "Publicum jus est,
quad ad staturn rei Romanae spectat; privatum, quad ad singulorum utilitatem (Public law is
that which concerns the state of the commonwealth; private law that which is for the use of
private individuals')." ULPIAN, DIGEST, quoted in R. DAVID, supra note 101, at 98. The practi-
cal application of this distinction, however, is far more difficult than Ulpian's definition would
indicate. Municipalities often contract with private businesses to handle certain public services.
Although this transaction concerns a state agency, the German courts will likely apply private
law, since the basic nature of the dealings between these parties is private contract law. E.
COHN, supra, at 11.
Two court hierarchies have been developed to handle the private and public law areas. For
the private law domain, jurisdiction is vested in the ordinary courts (ordentliche Gerichte). Id.
at 12. The ordinary courts, in turn, are divided into different levels: (1) the local courts
(Amtsgericht), having civil jurisdiction where the monetary amount is small and having criminal
jurisdiction over petty offenses; (2) the district courts (Landgericht), having original jurisdiction
in most other civil and criminal cases; (3) the courts of appeals (Oberlandesgericht), of which
there are nineteen; and (4) the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtsho). Id. at 53-56.
Questions of administrative law, however, are decided in specially created administrative
courts (Verwaltungsgericht). Id. at 57. Both of these court systems have jurisdiction over
constitutional issues, but, on appeal, these issues are heard before the Bundesgerichtshof. Id. at
64.
104. The common law jurisdictions have developed a set of rules governing administrative
areas, but not to the same extent as civil law countries. For example, both Germany and France
have a separate court system which handles administrative adjudications, see note 103 supra,
whereas in Great Britain and the United States the same courts have authority over both pri-
vate and public lawsuits.
105. Judicial liability in the United States would be treated as a private, nonadministrative
adjudication, either as a section 1983 action, a common law tort action, or a constitutional
action. Although judicial liability in a civil law jurisdiction would seem to be a public law
question, it is treated as a private law action in most civil law countries. See text accompanying
notes 186-229, 112, 139 infra.
106. In Germany, this principle is set forth in article 97 of the Basic Law, E. COHN, supra
note 103, at 41, whereas in France, it may be implied from the French Constitution and has
traditionally been a part of the system. R. DAVID, supra note 101, at 28, 57-58. The inde-
pendence of the judiciary in the United States may be implied from the separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances inherent in the Constitution. See generally Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
1977]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
questions of commercial, labor, and agricultural law. 10 7  In Germany, there
are five sets of courts covering different subject areas, each with its own
appellate courts.' 08
Distinctions also exist in the training for judgeships in the respective
systems. Many judges in the United States are appointed or elected to the
bench after years of service in the legal profession, but most civil law judges
enter the judiciary immediately upon completion of their legal education. 10 9
The immediate placement into the judicial ranks causes a judge to view a
case as an academician, not as an advocate. The civil law judge is primarily a
theoretician; he "is particularly interested in the coherence of legal princi-
ples and the harmony of the system." 110 Although the experiential differ-
ence between the systems is genuine, it is difficult to conceive how these
differences undermine the proposition that the judicial immunity experience
in civil law countries may provide guidelines to be used in the adoption of
qualified immunity in the United States.
In summary, the differences between the common and civil law systems
do not justify their disparate treatment of judicial liability. In fact, the two
systems are similar in their independent judiciaries and in the application of
private versus public law to the issue of judicial immunity."' Both Ger-
many and France allow private suits against the judiciary. The specifics
under which their systems operate suggest a possible framework adaptable
for application in the United States.
A. Germany
1. Personal Liability
As a general proposition, judges in the German system have only a par-
tial immunity from suit. In practice, an action against a judge would be
brought in a civil court in accordance with the rules of private law. 1 12  The
107. M. AMOS & P. WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 7 (3d ed. F.H. Lawson,
A.E. Anton & L.N. Brown eds. 1967).
108. E. COHN, supra note 103, at 36.
109. R. DAVID, supra note 101, at 54.
110. Id. at 57.
111. Since the major differences between the two systems have only a minimal impact on
judicial liability, the question of why civil law countries have adopted judicial liability becomes
even more difficult to answer. Perhaps judicial liability exists today in civil law countries but not
in common law countries because of the diverse historical development of the two systems. Just
as judicial immunity was formulated early in the development of Anglo-American law, judicial
liability also has deep historical roots in the civil law. In Germany, for example, the liability of
judges was well established prior to the nineteenth century. See text accompanying notes
114-21 infra. During this same period, American and English courts were solidifying the doc-
trine of judicial immunity.
112. Hink, The German Law of Governmental Tort Liability, 18 RuTGERS U.L. REv. 1069
(1964). France, however, has developed a separate system of administrative courts, which apply
their own body of administrative law to claims against government entities and officials. See
notes 136-38 infra and accompanying text.
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cause of action would be based on section 839 of the Burgerliches
Gesetzbuch (BGB) which provides for the liability of state officials.' 13 Al-
though it is codified today, such liability was a fundamental principle of the
German common law.
Prior to the codification of the German civil law in 1896, many of the
German states had developed a body of rules (Gemeinrecht) which became
the common law.1 1 4  The Gemeinrecht contained rules on the liability of
public officials to third parties for injuries resulting from a violation of their
duties. 1 1 5 The duties of a German judge included a variety of functions not
strictly judicial in nature, 1 16 and the liability of a judge was so broad that in
some states judges were accountable for all wrongs. 1 17
By the end of the eighteenth century, most of the common law, includ-
ing that on the liability of public officials, had been incorporated into statu-
tory law (Partikularrecht). "18 Under the Prussian Procedural Code, a judge
who was "negligent in his official duty to obey the laws should be responsi-
ble to the party whom he had injured." 119 And under the Saxony Civil
Code, judges were liable for "damages caused by malicious and grossly neg-
ligent misconduct."120  But both of these Codes had limitations; the Prus-
sian code required an exhaustion of other remedies and the Saxony code
required the claimant to show that he would still have been injured even if
he had used another legal remedy to avert the injury. 1 2 1
In 1896, the common law and statutory rules on tort liability of public
officials were codified in section 839 of the BGB. Subdivision 1 of that provi-
sion states that when an official breaches an official duty, either willfully or
negligently, he must compensate the injured party. 12 2 In addition, section
839(2) grants partial immunity to judicial officers by relieving judges from
liability if the breach consisted of giving judgment in a suit.1 23 If, however,
113. BURGERLICHES CESETZBUCH [BGB] § 839 (W. Ger.). See notes 122-29 infra and ac-
companying text for the text of section 839 and a discussion of its effects on judicial officers.
114. Hink, supra note 112, at 1070.
115. Id.
116. Id. For a partial list of the functions peculiar to the German judiciary, see id. at 1070
n.5.
117. Id. at 1071. However, in other states only grossly negligent or intentional acts could be
the basis for judicial liability. Id. Hink also observed that there might have been a requirement
of exhaustion of remedies before an injured claimant could proceed against the judge. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1072.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. BGB § 839(1):
If an official wilfully or negligently commits a breach of official duty incumbent
upon him as against a third party, he shall compensate the third party for any
damage arising therefrom. If only negligence is imputable to the official, he may be
held liable only if the injured party is unable to obtain compensation elsewhere.
123. Id. § 839(2):
If an official commits a breach of his official duty in giving judgment in an action,
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there is a criminal statute providing for liability for the particular breach, the
judge does not have immunity and can be sued. 124 Finally, section 839(3)
restates the common law principle that there is no liability if the injured
party either wilfully or negligently failed to use another legal remedy to
prevent the damage.' 2 5
In Germany, the distinction between discretionary and ministerial roles
does not have as much of an effect on liability as it does in the United
States.126  Although an official may not be liable for the use of his discre-
tionary powers, there are limitations to his immunity, 127 so that whenever
an official acts in violation of section 823, which provides for general private
tort liability, it is considered a breach of his official duty. Thus, a judge
under German law has immunity only when rendering judgment. Any other
judicial act may lead to liability.' 2 8 The rendering of a judgment in an
action also has a more limited meaning in Germany than it does in the
United States. A German judge, for example, would be liable under section
839(1) for "procedural rulings on motions or court orders of a general nature,
issuance of warrants for arrest, or subpoenas"' 2 9 because these are not
considered judgments.
2. State Liability
Liability of the German state for acts committed by public officials is
based on two concepts: the fscus, or private corporate liability, and gov-
he is not responsible for any damage arising therefrom, unless the breach of duty is
punished with a public penalty to be enforced by criminal proceedings. This provi-
sion does not apply to a breach of duty consisting of refusal or delay in the exercise
of the office.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 839(3):
The duty to make compensation does not arise if the injured party has wilfully or
negligently omitted to avert the injury by making use of a legal remedy.
One commentator has found six requirements that a claimant must show under section 839:
(1) the act was done in the "exercise of an official function;" (2) the officer violated one of his
official duties; (3) the officer owed a specific duty to a third party; (4) the officer was at fault; (5)
if the act is one of negligence, not intentional, then the claimant exhausted other sources of
restitution; (6) the claimant did not wilfully or negligently omit to use other legal remedies to
prevent the damage. Hink, supra note 112, at 1077-85.
126. The issue is not what function (ministerial or discretionary) the judge was performing at
the time he committed the act, but whether he owed an official duty to the injured party. It is
likely, however, that the "judgment exception" of section 839(2) is based partially on the fact
that when giving a judgment the judge is exercising his greatest degree of discretion.
127. An official who subjects himself to private tort liability is in breach of his official duty.
Hink, supra note 112, at 1082. A judge may be liable where he has acted "in a purely arbitrary
fashion" or has "thoroughly abused his discretion." Id.
128. Braband, Liability in Tort of the Government and Its Employees: A Comparative
Analysis with Emphasis on German Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 18, 31 (1958).
129. Id.
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ernmental liability. 130 Under thefj'scus concept, the private citizen has the
option of dealing with the government in certain situations, as in contractual
matters. By contrast, the citizen does not have an alternative to dealing with
the state when it acts in its governmental capacity.1 31 Judicial acts are al-
most always considered to be within the governmental functions concept.
The liability of the state for governmental functions is governed by article
34 of the Grundgesetz, or the Bonn Constitution: 
13 2
If any person, in exercising the duties of a public office entrusted
to him, violates his official duty to a third person, liability shall in
principle rest with the state or the public body which employs that
person. In the case of wilful intent or gross negligence, the
employing body's right of recourse against the public employee
shall be reserved. 133
When article 34 is read in conjunction with section 839, as was intended by
the authors of the Grundgesetz, the liability of the state for the acts of its
judicial officers is conclusive. 134 The only remaining issue is the state's
right of indemnity from the judge. The second sentence of article 34 indi-
cates that the state only has a right of recourse when an official, including a
judge, has acted wilfully or with gross negligence.1 35
B. France
In France, the judicial system is divided into two court hierarchies, the
regular, or civil, courts and the administrative courts.1 36 This division is a
consequence of the structure of French government being divided into
executive, legislative, and judicial spheres, with Parliament supreme.
The judiciary occupies the weakest position in French government, even
though the executive has lost considerable strength over the past two cen-
130. Id. at 32-45; Hink, supra note 112, at 1095.
131. Braband, supra note 128, at 38.
132. During the period of occupation by Allied forces after World War II, the representatives
of the Vest German states met in the Parliamentary Council, their purpose being to formulate
a unified system of laws to govern all of West Germany. Their efforts produced the Grundgesetz
or Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. This has become the constitution of West
Germany, commonly called the Bonn Constitution, and is effective until such time as all of
Germany is reunited. See Hink, supra note 112, at 1128.
133. GRUNDGEETZ art. 34 (W.Ger.), appearing in Hink, supra note 112, at 1128-29.
134. There are a few exceptions to the liability of the state for the acts of its public officers,
most of which are included in the Law on the Liability of the Empire for its Officials, May 22,
1910, [1910] REiCHGESETZBLATT [RGB1] 798 (W. Ger.). However, apparently none of these
exceptions include judicial officers. See Hink, supra note 112, at 1138, 1118-20.
135. Civil Service Act of July 14, 1953, [1953] 1 BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGB1] 551, 78, § 2
(W. Ger.), appearing in Hink, supra note 112, at 1129 n.252.
136. These two systems of law are labeled, respectively, the droit civil and the droit adminis-
tratif.
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turies in reaction to the powerful monarchies of the early Republics. Even
today, regular courts neither pass upon the constitutionality of legislation nor
control executive activity.' 37 To provide judicial control over legislative and
executive activity, a separate court system with limited jurisdiction, the ad-
ministrative courts, was established as a division of the executive branch. 138
1. Personal Liability
Suits against a French judge must be brought in a civil court.139 Judges
of all civil courts, except the Cour de Cassation, 140 the highest civil court,
may be liable either under criminal provisons of the Penal Code 141 or under
civil provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. 142  In a civil action, the
cause of action is specifically limited by the Code and includes "fraud, inten-
tional wrongful conduct or gross professional negligence ... and unreasona-
ble delay in rendering a decision." '4' The procedure for bringing a suit is
intentionally complicated and involves first obtaining permission to sue from
137. R. DAVID, supra note 101, at 27.
138. As a general rule, the administrative courts handle claims against the government and
its employees, while the regular courts adjudicate private law questions. In effect, the French
administrative law has been judicially developed by the highest administrative court, the Con-
seil d'Etat, whereas the private law has developed from various codes and statutes. Tradition-
ally, the distinction between the two systems has been based on the nature of the act. The
administrative courts have assumed jurisdiction over the faute de service, or service-connected
fault, where the government itself, and not the individual employee, was at fault. On the other
hand, when the act is afaute personnelle, or personal fault, then the officer is personally liable
in the civil courts. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 352-54 (3d ed. 1970); Hink,
Service-Connected Versus Personal Fault in the French Law of Government Tort Liability, 18
RUTGERS U.L. REv. 17 (1963).
One of the major problems occurs when the Conseil d'Etat and the highest civil court, Cour
de Cassation, reach inconsistent results. To resolve this conflict, an intermediary court, the
Tribunal des Conflicts, has the power to decide the issue in conflict or to select the proper
court system for resolution of the question. P. HERZOG & M. WESER, CMrIL PROCEDURE IN
FRANCE 116-18 (1967). Another important problem, at least from the perspective of the poten-
tial plaintiff, is the determination of whom to sue-the state in the administrative tribunals or
the officer in the civil courts. The administrative courts handle claims against the government so
long as the tort was service connected. If the act is afaute personnelle (private wrong), only the
officer and not the state is liable, and therefore he must be sued in the civil courts. Likewise, if
the act is afaute de service, then only the government is liable and the officer is relieved from
liability. Hink, supra, at 50. The dual system thus puts the burden on the injured party to
determine whether the act is a personal fault or a service-connected fault.
139. Jacoby, Federal Tort Claims Act and French Law of Governmental Liability: A Com-
parative Study, 7 VAND. L. REv. 246, 255 (1954).
140. P. HERZOG & H. WESER, supra note 138, at 138.
141. CODE PENALE arts. 183, 185 (Fr.).
142. C. PRO. CIv. arts. 505-09 (Fr.). Under the Civil Code there is a provision on general
tort liability, article 1382, but there is no specific article on the tort liability of public officers as
there is in Germany under section 839 of the BGB.
143. P. HERZOG & M. WESER, supra note 138, at 132-33.
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the presiding judge of the civil appellate court.144 If permission is granted,
the suit is then instituted in an appellate court, or in the Cour de Cassation
if a judge at the appellate court level is the defendant. 1 45
2. State Liability
Although the judge must be sued personally, the state is liable on the
judgment.' 4 6 However, the state has a right of reimbursement against the
judge on any judgments the state must pay. 147
V. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR GOVERNMENTAL
OFFICIALS: A CASE IN PoiNT AGAINST THE
JUDICIARY
It is not necessary, however, to look to civil law countries alone for guid-
ance respecting judicial liability. The elevated status of an immune judiciary
is further demonstrated by an examination of the type of immunity granted
other governmental officials in this country. Not only are these officials re-
stricted to a qualified privilege, but the nature of their offices, requiring the
widest leeway in the exercise of discretion, plus an historic grant of absolute
privilege, demonstrates conclusively that absolute judicial immunity is unjus-
tifiably unique.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 148 the personal representatives of the estates of
students who died in the Kent State tragedy. brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General and his assistant,
various officers of the Ohio National Guard, and the President of Kent State
University. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, after finding that the eleventh
amendment did not bar the suit, held that the state officers had a qualified,
not absolute, immunity, the degree of qualification "being dependent upon
the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the cir-
cumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which
liability is sought to be based." 149
Although a judge was not included among the Scheuer defendants, the
decision is important because the rationales cited by the Court as the tradi-
tional basis for executive immunity are the same as those offered in support
of judicial immunity. As articulated by Chief Justice Burger:
144. Id. at 132. If permission is denied, the litigant may appeal, but if he loses on appeal, he
may be subject to a fine. Id.
145. Id. at 133.
146. Jacoby, supra note 139, at 255.
147. P. HEBZOG & M. WESER, supra note 138, at 133; Jacoby, supra note 139, at 255.
148. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
149. Id. at 247.
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This official immunity apparently rested, in its genesis, on two
mutually dependent rationales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the
absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is re-
quired, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discre-
tion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his
willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the
judgment required by the public good. 150
Throughout the opinion, the Court relied heavily on the similarity between
judicial immunity and the immunity of public officials. At one point in the
opinion, Chief Justice Burger noticed that executive officers, "[l]ike legis-
lators and judges . . .are entitled to rely on traditional sources for the fac-
tual information on which they decide and act."151
One year later, the Supreme Court again faced the issue of public official
immunity. In Wood v. Strickland ' 5 2 an Arkansas school board had expelled
two female high school students for "spiking" the punch served at a meeting
of an extracurricular organization. The girls had admitted their involvement
when the faculty advisor of the organization told them that she would handle
their punishment. Knowledge of the incident quickly spread to the board,
however, and the members expelled the students for three months. The
students then brought suit under section 1983 against the school board
members, alleging denial of their due process rights. 1 53
As in Scheuer, the Court in Wood relied heavily on the discretionary
nature of a school board member's duties:
School board members .. .must judge whether there have been
violations of school regulations and, if so, the appropriate sanctions
for the violations. Denying any measure of immunity in these cir-
cumstances "would contribute not to principled and fearless
decision-making, but to intimidation." [quoting Pierson] The im-
150. Id. at 239-40. This rationale has been applied to judges and other officials having dis-
cretionary power. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423-24 (1976) (state prosecutor); Wood v.
Strickland 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) (school board members and school administrators); Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (judges).
It should be noted that the remarks quoted are quite similar to those used in conjunction
with judicial officers. In fact, the Court further emphasized the similarity in the rationale of the
judicial immunity and public officer immunity doctrines:
We are of the opinion that the same general considerations of public policy ant
convenience which demand for judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity
from civil suits for damages arising from acts done by them in the course of the
performance of their judicial functions, apply to a large extent to official communi-
cations made by heads of Executive Departments. ...
416 U.S. at 246 n.8, quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
151. 416 U.S. at 246. Only once did the Court attempt to distinguish the immunity of public
officers from judicial immunity, and that was in a footnote on the development of the immunity
doctrines. Id. at 239 n.4.
152. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
153. Id. at 309-13.
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position of monetary costs for mistakes which were not unreason-
able in the light of all the circumstances would undoubtedly deter
even the most conscientious school decisionmaker from exercising
his judgment independently, forcefilly, and in a manner best serv-
ing the long-term interest of the school and the students. 15 4
The Court also relied on cases upholding absolute immunity in determining
the scope of a school board member's immunity: "Tenney v. Brandhove,
Pierson v. Ray, and Scheuer v. Rhodes drew upon a very similar background
and were animated by a very similar judgment in construing § 1983
.... [W]e now rely on those same sources in determining whether and to
what extent school officials are immune from damage suits under § 1983." 155
Although both Tenney and Pierson recognized absolute immunity, the Wood
Court, purportedly relying on these cases, extended a school board mem-
ber's immunity only to acts done in good faith or with no knowledge of their
unconstitutionality.1 56
There are several possible reasons why the Court treated executive offi-
cers differently from judicial officers. The Court, if persuaded by the policy
reasons supporting judicial immunity, 157 may have determined that extend-
ing absolute immunity to executive officers was unwarranted because of the
inherent differences between executive and judicial roles and the different
treatment afforded each at common law.' 58
An executive or administrative official is faced with problems peculiar to
his office when making a decision. First, there are usually only untested
precedents from past administrations and statutory authorization is often too
general or too ambiguous to provide much specific guidance. Therefore, the
discretion involved in the decisionmaking process is of a more "political"
154. Id. at 319-20.
155. Id. at 320-21.
156. The Court specifically held:
[A] school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere
of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student af-
fected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the student.... A compensatory award will
be appropriate only if the school board member has acted with such an impermissi-
ble motivation or with such disregard of the student's clearly established constitu-
tional rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good
faith.
420 U.S. at 322.
157. See text accompanying notes 82-99 supra.
158. Another possible reason for the inconsistent results is that the judiciary, when faced
with a case involving judicial immunity, spends less time reviewing case precedents and legisla-
tive history, whereas when faced with the question of immunity for other public officers, the
court will analyze the issue in greater depth. In Pierson, the Supreme Court, when faced with
the issue of judicial immunity for the first time in almost a century, concluded its discussion of
the issue in a little over one page. 386 U.S. at 553-55. In Scheuer, however, the Court took
over 10 pages to decide the question of executive immunity. 416 U.S. at 238-49.
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nature than a "legal" nature; there is a "complete absence of any adequate
criteria by which to determine that their exercise of such a discretion in a
particular way was 'legally' wrongful." 159 Although the official could hold
hearings on the matter, these hearings would not normally have the adver-
sary element necessary for a complete exposition of the facts. More impor-
tantly, executive and administrative officials are often unable to hold hear-
ings because they must act within a relatively short period of time.' 60  Con-
sequently, "[d]ecisions in such situations are more likely than not to arise in
an atmosphere of confusion, ambiguity, and swiftly moving events and ...
there is often no consensus as to the appropriate remedy."161 Because of
the dearth of reliable authority and the pace of the executive decisionmaking
process, it is likely that some decisions are erroneous, even when the official
acted with good faith. Thus, qualified immunity for administrative officials is
justifiable. 162
A judge, on the other hand, uses different resources to guide his deci-
sion. Although the judge exercises discretion in making a decision, he has
been fully briefed on the factual dispute, he is aware of the legal arguments
that might apply, he is informed of the case precedents or statutory authori-
zations upon which he may rely, and he has more time to consider his
choices. Therefore, why should judicial officers be given greater immunity
than executive officers?
In neither situation, however, should a malicious or corrupt official be
given immunity. The disqualifying effect of bad faith was explicitly applied
to executive officers in Scheuer. 163  The same principle should pertain to
judicial officers since they are equally susceptible to a charge of malice.' 64
In Imbler v. Pachtman 165 the Court explained the seeming inconsisten-,
cies among the past decisions by relying upon the common law development
of the respective immunity theories. The plaintiff in Imbler had logically
argued that a state prosecutor, as a member of the executive branch, could
159. Jennings, supra note 84, at 275.
160. See id. at 296-97.
161. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1974).
162. The Supreme Court used the same rationale to justify absolute immunity for pro-
secutors. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), Mr. Justice Powell observed that "fre-
quently acting under serious constraints of time and even information, a prosecutor inevitably
makes many decisions that could engender colorable claims of constitutional deprivation." Id. at
425. The Court, however, determined that a prosecutor's role was more closely akin to that of a
judge.
163. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
164. The presence of malice and the intention to deprive a person of his civil rights is
wholly incompatible with the judicial function. When a judge acts intentionally
and knowingly to deprive a person of his constitutional rights the exercises no
discretion or individual judgment; he acts no longer as a judge, but as a "minis-
ter" of his own prejudices.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 567 n.6 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
165. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See note 80 supra.
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only claim a qualified immunity in accordance with Scheuer and other
executive immunity cases.1 66 The Court disagreed, holding that a pros-
ecutor's function was more closely akin to that of judges and grand jurors,
and therefore he should be granted complete immunity. In justification of
the different degrees of immunity afforded executive and judicial officers,
Mr. Justice Powell observed:
Our earlier decisions on Section 1983 immunities were not pro-
ducts of judicial fiat that officials in different branches of govern-
ment are differently amenable to suit under Section 1983. Rather,
each was predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity
historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the
interests behind it. The liability of a state prosecutor under Section
1983 must be determined in the same manner. 1 67
Despite Mr. Justice Powell's assessment, a "considered inquiry into the
immunity historically accorded" judges at common law reveals that judges
were not uniformly granted an absolute immunity. 168 The states differed on
the immunity question,' 69 while the first Supreme Court decision on this
issue, Randall v. Brigham,17 0 denied immunity where the judicial act was
malicious or corrupt, or where an inferior court had acted in excess of its
jurisdiction. It is also doubtful that the decision in Pierson, the first Su-
preme Court judicial immunity case decided under section 1983, was based
upon a "considered inquiry:" the Pierson Court cited only one case to sup-
port its interpretation of the common law approach. 17 '
Whether the immunity accorded top executive officers by the common
law was qualified or absolute was not adequately answered in Scheuer. The
Scheuer decision relies on many cases involving lower echelon and
nonexecutive officers, 172 and the only top-executive officer immunity cases it
cites are Spalding v. Vilas 1 73 and Barr v. Matteo.174 Both of these deci-
166. Id. at 420-21. The string of Supreme Court immunity cases from Pierson to O'Connor
would seem to support the plaintiff's contention.
167. Id. at 421.
168. See text accompanying notes 20-36 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
170. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
171. 386 U.S. at 554, citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
172. For cases concerning lower executive officers, the Scheuer opinion cited Pierson and
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), both involving city police officers. For nonexecutive
officers, the Court cited Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (federal legislators), Pier-
son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (state judge), and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)
(state legislators). Although the Court relied heavily on these nonexecutive immunity cases,
these cases granted an absolute immunity, not a qualified immunity as advocated by the
Scheuer result.
173. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
174. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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sions granted an absolute, not a qualified, immunity to the respective execu-
tives. 175 In Spalding, the petitioner sued the Postmaster General, claiming
he had maliciously circulated a false statement that injured the petitioner's
legal practice. The Supreme Court gave the Postmaster absolute immunity,
even though his alleged act may have been maliciously motivated. In this
case of first impression, the Court stated:
We are of the opinion that the same general considerations of pub-
lic policy and convenience which demand for judges of courts of
superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising
from acts done by them in the course of the performance of their
judicial functions, apply to a large extent to official communications
made by heads of Executive Departments when engaged in the
discharge of duties imposed upon them by law .... [I]t is clear
... that [an executive] cannot be held liable to a civil suit for
damages . . . by reason of any personal motive that might be al-
leged to have prompted his action; for, personal motives cannot be
imputed to duly authorized official conduct. In exercising the func-
tions of his office, the head of an Executive Department, keeping
within the limits of his authority, should not be under an ap-
prehension that the motives that control his official conduct may,
at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for dam-
ages. 176
In Barr the respondents alleged that a press release issued by the Acting
Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization had defamed them. The Court,
relying principally on Spalding,17 7 held that the director was absolutely im-
mune from suit despite the ultra vires nature of the act and the malicious
motivation of the executive.
It is thus difficult to understand the Scheuer Court's reliance on either
Spalding or Barr to support its interpretation that the common law allowed
only a qualified immunity to executive officers. In addition, a review of the
executive immunity cases not discussed in Scheuer supports the conclusion
175. Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976),
indicates that the majority theory based on the common law development of the immunity
theories is erroneous when applied to executive officers. Justice White states:
Accordingly, we have declined to construe § 1983 to extend absolute immunity
from damage suits to a variety of state officials, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes [416 U.S. 232 (1974)] (various
executive officers, including the State's chief executive officer); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967) (policemen); and this notwithstanding the fact that, at least with
respect to high executive officers, absolute immunity from suit for damages would
have applied at common law. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Alzua v.
Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913).
424 U.S. at 434 (White, J., concurring).
176. 161 U.S. at 498.
177. The Court also made frequent reference to Judge Learned Hand's decision in Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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that executive officials were granted an absolute, not a qualified, immunity
at common law. In Cooper v. O'Connor,178 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Comptroller of the
Currency, his deputies, and other lesser federal officials were absolutely
immune from liability for damages resulting from their roles in the prosecu-
tion of a bank president. The court concluded that "as the acts of appellees
were performed in the discharge of their official duties, the motives with
which those duties were performed are immaterial." 1 79  Eleven years
earlier, the same court had found the Secretary of the Treasury also entitled
to absolute immunity.18 0 "
Although the preceeding cases indicate a common law absolute immunity
for executive officials, 181 the Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland
82
granted school board members a qualified, good-faith immunity. In its lim-
ited "inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant officials
[school board members] at common law," the Court observed that "state
courts have generally recognized that such officers should be protected from
tort liability under state law for all good-faith, nonmalicious action taken to
fulfill their official duties."183 As authority for this conclusion, Mr. Justice
White cited state court decisions from eight jurisdictions. 184 Not all states,
though, agreed. In Sweeney v. Young,1815 for example, school authorities had
dismissed a student for misconduct. The student subsequently brought a
civil action for damages against members of the school board. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that since the action taken was within the
general range of the school officials' duties, they were entitled to an abso-
lute, not a qualified, immunity. In short, neither the discretionary nature
rationale nor the common law immunity distinctions justify the inconsistency
of affording executives qualified immunity and judges absolute immunity.
VI. LIABILITY FOR JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
The preceeding survey of judicial immunity demonstrates several sig-
nificant points. First, since the Court's decision in Bradley has eliminated
178. 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1983).
179. Id. at 142.
180. Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
181. For other decisions concerning immunity for executive officers, see Lang v. Wood, 92
F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Attorney General, U.S. Parole Board members, Director of Prisons);
Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Chairman of the Federal Tariff Commission);
Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury).
182. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
183. Id. at 318.
184. Id. These jurisdictions are: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Illinois, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Missouri, and New Hampshire.
185. 82 N.H. 159, 131 A. 155 (1925).
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tort liability, and the decision in Pearson has eliminated section 1983 liabil-
ity, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity appears firmly entrenched in
the United States. However, the logic underlying this doctrine leaves much
to be desired and provides an opening for the return of both causes of ac-
tion. Furthermore, standards of accountability developed in civil law systems
provide conclusive proof that liability can exist within the judicial system.
And finally, the presence of a qualified immunity for other governmental
officials demands the same treatment for the judiciary.
Although a return to qualified judicial immunity is theoretically justifi-
able, actually imposing liability for the malicious or unauthorized acts of
American judges would raise a new series of practical problems. For exam-
ple, how does one sue a judge-in tort, under section 1983, or under a
constitutional cause of action? What standard of liability should apply? And,
once a judge is held liable, who pays the damages-the state or the indi-
vidual judge?
Our structure of dual federalism creates jurisdictional complexities which
could complicate imposition of judicial liability. The wrongful act itself may
be simple libel, protected by state law, or malicious prosecution which may
rise to the level of a constitutional violation of due process.
A. Potential Causes of Action for Judicial Liability
Causes of action which could provide viable routes to imposing judicial
liability now exist in both state and federal law. Principal among these are a
state tort action and a federal statutory or constitutional claim. Each course
would present different problems depending on whether the defendant was
a federal or state judge.
1. Federal Judges
The most obvious theory of liability would be simple common law
tort-malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or libel and slander.18 6 In
theory, the judiciary itself could abrogate judicial immunity at will since it is
a judicially created doctrine. In practice, a state court might not be willing
to sit in judgment of a fellow judge and disrupt 200 years of common law
development.' 8 7 The most direct solution, therefore, would be for state
legislatures to establish a limited liability by statute similar to the modern
186. For examples of these tort actions under absolute immunity, see O'Bryan v. Chandler,
352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 926 (1966); Garfield v. Palmieri, 297 F.2d
526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871 (1962); Ravenscroft v. Casey, 139 F.2d 776 (2d Cir.
1944).
187. Recently, some state courts have overturned the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which was equally well -established. See cases cited in note 91 supra.
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waivers of state sovereign immunity.18 8 On the federal level, the Federal
Tort Claims Act189 would have to be amended to specifically allow suits
against federal judges.
Tort liability, however, would not cover all areas of judicial misconduct.
A judge may also commit certain constitutional violations which are not vio-
lations of state tort law.' 90 For those constitutional infringements that are
also torts,1 91 the plaintiff's chances of recovery are dependent on the Va-
garies of state tort law 192 unless he sues on a constitutional, rather than a
tort, cause of action. If the plaintiff sues on a constitutional cause of action in
a state court, however, the defendant federal judge would be likely to re-
move to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441193 or 1442.194  Unlike re-
moval under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 for federal questions, section 1442 removal
jurisdiction has been construed to permit the federal courts to hear cases
removed from state courts even if they would not originally have had juris-
diction over the same action. 195 Therefore, assuming the abrogation of ab-
solute judicial immunity, a plaintiff could sue a federal judge on a constitu-
tional claim in state court without being defeated by federal removal juris-
diction.
188. For example, in Florida, Iowa, New York, and Washington, state tort immunity has
been abolished by statutory law. See FLA. STAT. § 768.151 (Supp. 1976); W. PROSSEB, HAND-:
BOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 986 & n.59 (4th ed. 1971).
189. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1970).
190. For example, a judge may deprive a party of a statutory right to a hearing. Although
this action would violate the litigant's fifth amendinent due process rights, it may not be a tort
under state law See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1535 n.20 (1972).
Furthermore, state tort law may not adequately compensate a victim of governmental abuse
of power even where the constitutional violation is also a tort. A government official has the
potential to inflict greater harm than does a private citizen. See Note, Damage Remedies
Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARv. L. REv. 922, 953 (1976).
191. False imprisonment and malicious prosecution may also violate the fifth and fourteenth
amendment due process clauses.
19g. Dellinger,. supra note 190, at 1535.
193. 28 U.S.C. 9 1441 (1970).
194. 28 U.S.C. 9 1442 (1970).
195. Section 1442(a)(3) states:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any
of the following persons mdy be removed by them to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pend-
ing:
(3) Any officer of the courts of the United States, for any act under color of office
or in the performance of his duties.
Removal under section 1442 does not require the federal court to have had original jurisdiction
over the suit. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406 (1969).
An argument could be made that the term "color of office" does not include tortious judicial
acts or other misconduct. See Anpey v. Thornton, 65 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1946). However,
in Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969), the Supreme Court interpreted the "color of
office" requirement to mean that the alleged acts must occur during the officers performance of
his duties:
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If a constitutionally based suit were removed to federal court under sec-
tion 1441,196 jurisdiction would be coextensive with the original jurisdiction
of the federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 1343. The limitations of
section 1983, discussed below, would bar a suit against a federal judge under
28 U.S.C. § 1343. Section 1331 grants jurisdiction, but neither that section
nor the federal Constitution provide a specific damage remedy. In the past,
a constitutionally based suit originating in a federal court would have been
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless a specific damage rem-
edy was authorized by another federal statute. 197 Thus, if a plaintiff sued
in state court and the defendant removed to federal court under section
1441, or if he sued originally in federal court, he would be precluded from
recovery for constitutional, nontortious, injuries.
Within the past few years, however, a number of federal courts have
shown a willingness to allow a constitutionally based cause of action for dam-
ages with jurisdiction under section 1331 even when there is no specific
statutory authorization for such a remedy.198 The possibility of such a suit
The federal officer removal statute is not "narrow" or "limited." Colorado v. Symes,
286 U.S. 510, 517 (1932). At the very least, it is broad enough to cover all cases
where federal officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to
enforce federal law.
In a civil suit of this nature, we think it was sufficient for petitioners to have
shown that their relationship to respondent derived solely from their official duties.
Past cases have interpreted the "color of office" test to require a showing of a
"'causal connection" between the charged conduct and asserted authority .... In
this case, once petitioners had shown that their only contact with respondent occur-
red inside the penitentiary, while they were performing their duties, we believe
that they had demonstrated the required "causal connection." The connection con-
sists, simply enough, of the undisputed fact that petitioners were on duty, at their
place of federal employment, at all the relevant times.
Id. at 406-07, 409. Thus, under the liberal test established in WiUingham, federal judicial
misconduct almost always would fall within the "color of office" requirement of section 1442.
Because of this absolute right of removal, a federal judge may be able to remove to the
federal court of which he is a member. In Meredith v. Van Oosterhout, 286 F.2d 216 (1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 835 (1961), a United States judge for the Eighth Circuit was sued for
alleged malicious acts in rendering a judgment against the plaintiff in a prior suit. The judge
then removed to the federal district court and the case was ultimately adjudicated by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the judge's own court.
196. A state or federal judge could remove to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970), if
that court would have original jurisdiction over the suit. Section 1441(a), (b) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the
parties.
197. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE §
3563, at 415 (1975).
198. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
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has existed since 1946, when the Supreme Court, in Bell v. Hood,199 held
that jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (the predecessor of 28
U.S.C. § 1331)200 over a suit brought to recover damages for a violation of
the plaintiff's fourth and fifth amendment rights. The Court remanded the
case to the district court, however, for a determination of whether a cause of
action for damages existed for the unconstitutional violation of the fourth
amendment by a federal agent. Bell, therefore, did not provide a conclusive
decision. 201
This question was finally answered when the Supreme Court faced the
issue in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narco-
tics. 20 2  In Bivens, agents from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics illegally
broke into the plaintiff's apartment and arrested him for an alleged narcotics
violation. Bivens later brought a civil action in federal court claiming viola-
tion of his fourth amendment rights, and alleged jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. If his allegations had been true, Bivens could have raised his
claim as a defense, and could have successfully had any evidence suppressed
at a subsequent prosecution; but since no charges were ever brought against
him, Bivens was left without a remedy for the unconstitutional invasion of
his privacy.
In a 5-4 decision, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held
that a violation of the fourth amendment by federal officers gives rise to a
cause of action for damages. 203 Finding that the fourth amendment pro-
vides a federal right independent of state common law, 204 the Court deter-
mined that it had the power to create a damage remedy directly from a
(1971); Hanna v. City of Euclid, 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975); Skehan v. Board of Trustees of
Bloomfield State College, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498
F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (4th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d
Cir. 1972); Patterson v. City of Chester, 389 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Butler v. United
States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973).
199. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
200. This section is the general federal question jurisdiction statute, now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
201. 327 U.S. at 684-85.
Jurisdiction and a cause of action are two separate and distinct concepts, although both must
exist before a suit can be brought. A common mistake is to assume that 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970), a jurisdictional statute, provides a cause of action in and of itself. Section 1331 only
grants to the federal courts the jurisdiction to hear a suit based on a federal question cause of
action. The federal question, whether it involves a federal statute or the Constitution, also must
be alleged since it is the cause of action. Previously, a cause of action for damages based
directly on a violation of a constitutional provision, without any statutory authorization as, for
example, section 1983, was not recognized. See text accompanying note 197 supra.
202. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). There was, however, a Supreme Court decision in 1933 which had
indicated that a plaintiff could sue for damages under the fifth amendment. See Jacobs v.
United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
203. 403 U.S. at 397.
204. Respondents had argued that their unreasonable search constituted an invasion of the
right of privacy--a tort actionable in the state courts. In this situation, the fourth amendment
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violation of a constitutional provision.20 5 To support this conclusion, Justice
Brennan noted: "That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent
upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly
seem a surprising proposition. Historically, damages have been regarded as
the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty. " 20 6
Although the specific holding of Bivens is limited to a cause of action
based on the fourth amendment, later decisions have relied on Bivens in
finding a damage remedy inherent in other constitutional provisions. 20 7 For
example, in Apton v. Wilson,20 8 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that a deprivation of rights under the fifth amend-
ment due process clause gives rise to a cause of action for damages.2 09 This
cause of action could serve as a route to liability for many acts of judicial
misconduct by federal judges, such as malicious prosecution or the denial of
a hearing.
Thus, although tort liability in the state courts would provide a remedy
for some wrongful acts of federal judges, the most direct approach to liability
for deprivations of constitutional rights would be through a cause of action
based on the Constitution. The Bivens and Apton decisions have laid the
foundations for such suits against federal agents. It now remains to extend
those decisions to cover the actions of a federal judge who maliciously de-
prives a litigant of his constitutional rights.
For either tort liability or a constitutional cause of action to be effective,
however, both federal and state jurisdictions must adopt an equivalent
standard of immunity. Otherwise, a federal judge's right of removal to fed-
eral court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 would bar recovery. If the state has
retained absolute judicial immunity while the federal government grants
only a qualified immunity, then the federal judge would prefer to be tried in
the state court under state law. The state court would dismiss the suit on
the grounds of absolute immunity and the plaintiff might be precluded from
refiling in federal court, depending on whether the federal court would have
provisions could only be interposed as a limitation on the defense of federal authority. Id. at
390-91. In response, the Court observed that the fourth amendment's scope was broader than
conduct unlawful under state tort law. Id. at 392-94.
205. The power of the Court to create constitutional damage remedies was bitterly contested
by the three dissenting justices, Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice
Blackmun, who claimed that this power was exclusively vested in Congress. Id. at 411-12,
427-30.
206. Id. at 395.
207. E.g., Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); States Marine Lines, Inc. v.
Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974); United States ex re. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 982 (3d
Cir. 1972); Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Ill. 1975).
208. 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
209. The Apton court also noted that the district court had federal question jurisdiction over
this cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 95.
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original jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the federal court retained abso-
lute immunity while the state court adopted qualified immunity, then the
federal judge would remove. Thus, if differing immunity standards were
available, a federal judge would always be absolutely immune.
2. State Judges
Absent immunity, a state judge would also be liable for common law
torts. Jurisdiction over such suits is vested only in the state courts, and,
unlike suits against federal judges, there is no right of removal to the federal
courts. 21 0  For those harms that violate federally or constitutionally pro-
tected rights, either a direct constitutional cause of action with jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331211 or a cause of action based on section 1983
through 28 U.S.C. § 1343212 is available. A section 1983 suit could be
brought either in a state court,213 in which case the defendant state judge
could remove to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441,214 or in a federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. While an action under section 1983 would
comport with the original purpose of that section, 215 section 1983 is limited
to persons acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory."' 2 16  Accordingly, a state judge who
210. A federal court would not have original jurisdiction over nonconstitutional torts nor does
a state judge have an absolute right of removal.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Section 1331(a) states:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
See text accompanying notes 198-209 supra.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). Section 1343(3) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any persons:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law ... of any
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States
or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens ....
213. Although a jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), was enacted to provide fed-
eral jurisdiction for section 1983 suits (see note 212 supra), section 1343 gives no indication that
it provides exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. Consequently, section 1983 suits have
been brought in state courts. See Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil
Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615, 616 n.4 (1970).
214. See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
215. Section 1983 was enacted to provide "a federal remedy for deprivations of constitutional
rights and immunities caused by state officials acting under color of state law." 21 WAYNE L.
1Ev. 1103 (1975). Moreover, the legislative record on the debates surrounding the enactment of
section 1983 indicates that judicial officers were meant to be included under this section. See
text accompanying notes 66-76 supra.
216. This phrase has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966), to be the equivalent of the "state action" requirement of the four-
teenth amendment.
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maliciously deprived a person of a constitutionally protected right would be
amenable to suit under section 1983, but a federal judge would not be. 21 7
A third potential cause of action, adoption of which would eliminate the
necessity for and the problems inherent in a section 1983 action, 218 is the
direct constitutional cause of action with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. Although the Bivens case was limited to federal agents, recent cases
have relied on Bivens to imply constitutionally based causes of action for
deprivations of constitutional rights by state agencies and municipalities, 2 19
which could be extended to state judges. The development of municipal
liability is illustrative of this approach.
Municipalities have consistently been found not to be within the scope of
section 1983. Although the basis for this exclusion is different from the de-
fense to section 1983 afforded to state judges, 220 there are analytic
similarities. In City of Kenosha v. Bruno,221 the Supreme Court held that
the municipality was not a "person" and therefore was not amenable to suit
under section 1983.222 More importantly for our purposes, however, the
Court left open the possibility of a direct constitutional cause of action for
damages against a municipality. In remanding the suit, the Court ordered
that the amount in controversy be determined, and observed that if this
amount exceeded the $10,000 jurisdictional limit of section 1331, then juris-
diction would exist. 223  Although the Court did not explicitly identify the
cause of action, it appeared that the action was to be based on a violation of
the petitioner's fourteenth amendment due process rights. This presumption
217. Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray
Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615, 624 (1970). However, a federal judge may be liable
under section 1983 in the rare situation where he "is a willful participant in joint activity with
the State or its agents." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966). See Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
218. The establishment of a section 1983 action would require the Supreme Court to over-
rule Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
219. See, e.g., City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Shehan v. Board of Trustees,
501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974); Patterson v. City of Chester, 389 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
220. Although a state judge may be a "person" under section 1983, the Supreme Court has
found that he is entitled to absolute immunity when sued under that statute. Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967). A municipality, however, is not a "person" within the meaning of section
1983 and, therefore, the immunity issue is never reached in a section 1983 suit against a munic-
ipality. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
221. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
222. The holding in Kenosha was limited to a section 1983 suit for equitable relief. However,
in 1961 the Court determined that a municipality was not a "person" within the meaning of
section 1983 in a suit for damages. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
223. 412 U.S. at 514. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 262 (1973);
Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations 89 HARV. L. REv.
922, 929-30 (1976).
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is supported by Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in which he cited
both Bell and Bivens in commenting upon the Court's remand order.2 A
Numerous cases after Kenosha have upheld direct constitutional causes of
action for damages against state agencies and officials. 225 Allowing a suit
against a state agency in a federal or state court for the deprivation of a
person's constitutional rights without having to allege a cause of action based
on another federal statute is the most direct and efficient route toward liabil-
ity. The same approach could be utilized in a suit against a state judge who
has maliciously deprived a person of his constitutional rights if the bar of
absolute immunity were removed.
3. Factors Affecting the Choice of a Cause of Action
Even if the above causes of action were utilized, certain problems would
arise from the different minimum amount requirements of their respective
jurisdictional statutes and the removal power. General federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires a $10,000 minimum, 226 while
section 1983 suits with section 1343 jurisdiction have no minimum amount
requirement.227 Most state courts have a lower minimum requirement than
section 1331. Though similar disparities exist for other types of suits, the
disparity in constitutional suits is significant due to the difficulty of valuing
the damages caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right. In the past,
constitutional suits based on section 1331 were dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion. by some courts because of the courts' perceived incapability of valuing
the injury. 228 Other courts, however, took the position that a constitutional
right is inherently worth more than $10,000. 22 9
Jurisdiction for section 1983 claims exists in federal courts by virtue of 28
U.S.C. § 1343, and may exist in state courts (depending on the particular
state's jurisdictional statutes). Unlike section 1331 and most state jurisdic-
224. Mr. Justice Brennan, the author of the Bivens opinion, stated:
Appellees did assert 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as an alternative ground of jurisdiction....
If appellees can prove their allegation that at least $10,000 is in controversy, then §
1331 jurisdiction is available, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); cf. Bivens v. Six
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and they are clearly entitled to relief.
412 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), for an application of the Kenosha proposition.
225. E.g., Shehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974); Patterson v. City of
Chester, 389 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
226. See note 211 supra.
227. See note 212 supra.
228. See Goldsmith v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395 (1970).
229. Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir..1971); P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1158-59 (2d ed. 1973); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1, 262--63 (1973).
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tional statutes, section 1343 has no minimum amount. Thus, when suing a
state judge, the plaintiff most likely would want to bring suit in federal court
under sections 1983 and 1343 rather than bringing a constitutional claim
under section 1331.
A direct constitutional cause of action in a federal court, however, must
'be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction. Thus, if a plaintiff brought suit in
a federal court under this cause of action, he would have to allege damages
in excess of $10,000. As this action is the only one available for a plaintiff
suing a federal judge for a constitutional, nontortious, violation, this plaintiff
is unfairly disadvantaged in comparison to a plaintiff suing a state judge
under sections 1983 and 1343. One answer to this discrepancy is for the
plaintiff to sue the federal judge in a state court where the jurisdictional
amount requirement would presumably be much less than the $10,000 sec-
tion 1331 requirement. Even if the federal judge removes to federal court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, the absence of the minimum amount is insignifi-
cant in such removal proceedings.
Therefore, in order to avoid meeting section 1331's $10,000 minimum
amount requirement, a plaintiff should consider the following actions: (1)
suing a state judge under sections 1983 and 1343 in a federal court; (2) suing
a state judge under a direct constitutional cause of action in a state court; (3)
suing a federal judge under a direct constitutional cause of action in a state
court.
B. Standard of Liability for Judicial Misconduct
A standard of liability to be imposed upon judges may be determined by
reference to the examples provided by civil law countries and by executive
immunity in the United States. Both France and Germany provide liability
in cases of willful judicial misconduct. In Germany, there is immunity for
error in rendering a decision, but tortious conduct of misfeasance in connec-
tion with ministerial acts is not protected. 230  Similarly, it was noted that in
France "'[firaud, intentional wrongful conduct or gross professional negli-
gence" are actionable. 23 1
Two tests for executive and administrative immunity have been used in
the United States. Both are based on good faith and reasonable action. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Supreme Court held that the standard for qualified
immunity "is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the
time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief." 
232
A different test was used in Wood v. Strickland:
230. See text accompanying notes 122-29 supra.
231. See text accompanying notes 139-45 supra.
232. 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
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[W]e hold that a school board member is not immune from liability
for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official respon-
sibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student af-
fected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the
student. 233
Unfortunately, the Scheuer and Wood tests are unsatisfactory when
applied to judges. Both tests adopt the "reasonable man" standard of negli-
gence actions, but holding judges liable for negligence would present several
problems. First, in order to allow suits for judicial malpractice, a profes-
sional standard of conduct for judges would have to be established.M4  Sec-
ond, judges would be subject to more frivolous litigation if their actions
could be attacked for mere negligence. 235 Finally, the spector of judicial
malpractice suits would deter persons from seeking judicial positions. 236
A malice standard, similar to the New York Times testM7 would be more
suitable for determining judicial liability. 23s Adoption of this standard has
three distinct advantages: (1) it alleviates the problems of determining what
constitutes professional judicial competence; (2) it gives the plaintiff the bur-
den of proving malice, instead of the defendant having to show good faith
and reasonableness of action; and (3) it satisfies the purpose of judicial liabil-
ity by providing a remedy for malicious judicial acts, not honest errors. 23 9
C. Who Pays the Damages?
There are two potential sources of remuneration for judicial
misconduct-the individual judge and the state. Unless the particular state
233. 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
234. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE. L.J. 322, 335 (1969).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. The test adopted in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is that liability
will result when the act is done with "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." Id. at 280.
238. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 335-38
(1969); Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray
Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615, 624 (1970).
239. See 2 F. HARPER'& F. JAMEs, THE LAw OF TORTS 1645 (1956), where the authors
observe:
Where the charge is one of honest mistake, we exempt the officer because we deem
that an actual holding of liability would have worse consequences than the possibil-
ity of an actual mistake (which under the circumstances we are willing to condone).
But it is stretching the argument pretty far to say that the mere inquiry into malice
would have worse consequences than the possibility of actual malice (which we
would not, for a minute, condone). Since the danger that official power will be
abused is greatest where motives are improper, the balance here may well swing
the other way.
(emphasis original).
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has waived its immunity, however, the injured victim will have to sue the
judge personally. The eleventh amendment specifically provides that a state
may not be sued by citizens of another state.2 4 0  In Hans v. Louisiana,24 1
the Supreme Court expanded this amendment by holding that an unconsent-
ing state is also immune from suits brought by its own citizens. However,
the immunity theory was modified in Ex parte Young,2 4 2 where the Court
held that when a state officer, acting under state law, violates a constitu-
tional provision, he "is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct." 243
After Ex parte Young, numerous suits were brought against state officials
demanding payment from the state treasury. 244  Although most of these
suits were successful, a few were held barred by the eleventh amendment.
In 1974, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of Ex parte Young, hold-
ing, in Edelman v. Jordan,245 that a "suit by private parties seeking to im-
pose a liability payable from public funds in the state treasury is foreclosed
by the Amendment if the State does not consent to suit."2 46  Thus, an
injured party could impose personal liability on a state judge. If the party,
however, sought reimbursement from state funds, his suit would be barred
by the eleventh amendment, unless immunity was waived by the state.247
240. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State." U.S. CONST. Amend. XI.
The amendment only applies to suits brought in federal court. Where a state official is the
named party but recovery is sought from the state treasury, then the suit is against the state for
eleventh amendment purposes. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885). Thus, the amendment would apply to
section 1983 actions brought under section 1343.
241. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
242. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
243. Id. at 160.
244. See State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972),
aff'g 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Wyman
v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), aff'g Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Although most of these suits were successful, a few
were held barred by the eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
245. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
246. Id. (syllabus).
247. This analysis is supported by the Supreme Court's discussion of the eleventh amend-
ment in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). In Scheuer, the Court cites Edelman for the
proposition that "it is clear that the doctrine of Ex parte Young is of no aid to a plaintiff seeking
damage from the public treasury." Id. at 238. The Court then states:
Analyzing the complaints in light of these precedents, we see that petitioners
allege facts that demonstrate they are seeking to impose individual and personal
liability on the named defendants .... Whatever the plaintiffs may or may not be
able to establish as to the merits of their allegations, their claims, as stated in the
complaints ... are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. (emphasis original).
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State tort immunity has been abolished or limited in 37 states.248  In
most of these states, where the state legislature has enacted tort claims stat-
utes, the state assumes liability for certain types of torts committed by its
employees while reserving immunity from other torts.2 9  Thus, if judicial
immunity were limited, the injured party's ability to receive compensation
from the state would depend on the respective state tort claims statute.
The assumption of liability by the state for acts of its employees is similar
to the civil law system. In France, the judge is sued personally, with the
state having a right of reimbursement against the judge.25 0  Similarly, in
Germany the state is ultimately liable for judicial misconduct. 251  The ad-
vantage in holding the state responsible for judicial misconduct is that judi-
cial disciplinary boards may deal more harshly with a judge who has sub-
jected the state to liability.
Under current law, therefore, the judge would most likely have to pay
the damages awarded the injured party, unless the state has waived its im-
munity. This result is consistent with policy considerations behind judicial
liability; if the judge is held financially accountable for his malicious wrong-
doings, he will be less inclined to abuse his office. While it could be argued
that personal liability will deter qualified candidates from seeking judicial
positions, that conclusion is spurious. Assumedly, a qualified candidate
would act with a high degree of integrity and honesty once in office and,
therefore, would have no occasion to be subject to judicial liability.
VII. CONCLUSION
The development of the judicial immunity doctrine is the result of the
long-term exercise of unchallenged judicial authority. Although the doctrine
did have roots in the English common law, its development in the United
States may be attributed more to a willingness by the courts to find that the
doctrine was solidly established and to an inadequate investigation of the
reasons offered in support of judicial immunity than to its historical founda-
248. Note, Governmental Tort Immunity in Massachusetts: The Present Need for Change and
Prospects for the Future, 10 SuFFoLx U.L. REv. 521, 523-24 (1976).
249. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.260-.300 (1967). See generally Note, Governmental
Tort Immunity in Massachusetts: The Present Need for Change and Prospects for the Future, 10
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 521 (1976).
Although the eleventh amendment problem would not apply to federal judges, suits against
the federal government have been barred in the past on the basis of sovereign immunity.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 257 (1821). But, in 1946 the United States waived its
immunity in part by the adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80
(1970). In Cromelin v. United States, 177 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1949), the court found that a
federal judge was not within the scope of the FTCA. Therefore, a federal judge could only be
personally liable.
250. See text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.
251. See text accompanying notes 130-35 supra.
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tions. If the courts had investigated, they would have found either that the
rationales were inherently unsound or that they had been considerably
weakened by modem procedural safeguards.
Moreover, the integrity of the judicial immunity doctrine comes into
question when the decisions supporting this doctrine are compared with re-
cent cases finding only a qualified immunity for executive and administrative
officials acting in a similar discretionary capacity. The Supreme Court's be-
lated attempt to distinguish between qualified and absolute immunity cases
on the basis of their common law foundations is not adequately supported by
the appropriate lines of judicial, executive, and administrative decisions. In
fact, there are more similarities between the judicial role and other execu-
tive or administrative positions which favor granting the same qualified im-
munity to all officials than there are differences between the respective posi-
tions which require different levels of immunity.
While civil law jurisdictions have surged ahead in allowing tort claims
against public officers, including judges, the common law countries have
been reluctant to depart from the notion that public officials, particularly
judges, should not be held accountable for their actions. In developing a
qualified immunity, the civil law countries have specified conduct that will
lead to judicial liability, and have developed a system of remuneration which
guarantees payment to the injured party. These characteristics may provide
a guideline to framers of a qualified judicial immunity doctrine in the United
States.
A variety of mechanisms are available to the courts and legislators to
implement a qualified, good-faith immunity doctrine. To provide an impar-
tial coverage of federal and state judges, however, the states must allow
limited tort liability. There must also be a remedy for deprivations of con-
stitutional rights, possibly through a specific statutory enactment, similar to
section 1983, covering both state and federal judges, or derived as a result of
judicial action finding a direct constitutional cause of action against judges
for violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The trend of modem judicial procedure has been to provide a remedy
for damages resulting from the acts of federal or state public officers. This
trend, unfortunately, has bypassed persons injured from judicial misconduct
on the basis of an antiquated immunity theory. The time has come to
reevaluate the immunity doctrine and to recognize that the establishment of
a good-faith immunity would be a further step towards a judicial system of
fair, impartial, and unprejudiced justice.
DOUGLAS K. BARTH
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